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THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
James G. Stewart*

Modes of liability, such as ordering, instigation, superior
responsibility and joint criminal liability, are arguably the most discussed
topics in modern international criminal justice. In recent years, a wide
range of scholars have rebuked some of these modes of liability for
compromising basic concepts in liberal notions of blame attribution,
thereby reducing international defendants to mere instruments for the
promotion of wider socio-political objectives. Critics attribute this
willingness to depart from orthodox concepts of criminal responsibility to
international forces, be they interpretative styles typical of human rights
or aspirations associated with transitional justice. Strangely, however,
complicity has avoided these criticisms entirely, even though it too fails
the tests international criminal lawyers use as benchmarks in the
deconstruction of other modes. Moreover, the source of complicity’s
departures from basic principles is not international as previously
suggested—it stems from international criminal law’s emulation of
objectionable domestic criminal doctrine. If, instead of inheriting the dark
sides of domestic criminal law, we apply international scholars’ criticisms
across all modes of liability, complicity (and all other modes of liability)
disintegrates into a broader notion of perpetration. A unitary theory could
also attach to all prosecutions for international crimes, both international
and domestic, transcending the long-endured fixation on modes of liability
within the discipline.
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“I have the most profound conviction that I am being made to pay
here for the glass that others have broken.”
Adolf Eichmann1
I. INTRODUCTION
International criminal courts and tribunals use the term “modes of
liability” to designate participants in a crime. Even though the label is
conceptually misleading and of uncertain historical pedigree,2 it has
emerged as the preferred description of a whole series of doctrine, ranging
from traditional notions of instigation to the more exotic concepts of
superior responsibility and joint criminal enterprise. Understandably, the
concepts attract tremendous judicial and scholarly treatment. After all, the
contours of “modes of liability” determine whether Eichmann’s
1

Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocities, 105
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1764 (2005) (quoting from GERMAN
CRIMINAL LAW ENRIQUE GIMBERNAT ORDEIG, AUTOR Y COMPLICE EN DERECHO PENAL
[PERPETRATOR AND ACCOMPLICE IN CRIMINAL LAW] COLUM. L. REV. trans., 1996)).
2
Importantly, the phrase “modes of liability” is conceptually misleading and of uncertain
historical pedigree. It is legally misleading because these doctrines only attribute
unlawfulness rather than “liability”. The better term is “modes of attribution,” since
whether a defendant is “liable” once a particular unlawful act is attributed to her requires
a further assessment of justifications and excuses. Admittedly, this nomenclature is
premised on a preference for the normative theory of guilt GEORGE FLETCHER, THE
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW : AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 319, 329
(2007). In terms of origin, it is also unclear where international criminal justice acquired
the term “modes of liability,” and why it gained such ascendency in the discipline. Early
international judgments used the more appropriate phrase “modes of participation”:
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 227 (May 7, 1997) (referring to
joint criminal enterprise as a “mode of participation”); Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT04-83-T, Judgment, ¶ 56 (Sep. 15, 2008) (referring to superior responsibility as a “mode
of participation”); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 266 (Mar. 3,
2000) (discussing ordering, planning, instigating or otherwise aiding and abetting as
“modes of participation”). This accords with the descriptor adopted in most domestic
criminal systems. In German criminal law, the overarching concept is 'Beteiligung',
which experts translate as 'Participation'. See MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 154 (2008); French criminal theory also refers to criminal
participation, see Christine Lazerges, La participation criminelle, in RÉFLEXIONS SUR LE
NOUVEAU CODE PÉNAL, 11 (1995); for historical antecedents, see also B. GETZ, DE LA
SOI-DISANT PARTICIPATION AU CRIME (1876); in many Anglo-American jurisdictions, the
tendency is to describe modes of liability as those rules that determine parties to crime.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, 5TH 701 (5th ed. 2010) (employing the term
“Parties to Crime”); A. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW : THEORY AND
DOCTRINE 195-246 (3rd ed. 2007) (discussing modes of participation).
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punishment for the glass others broke is an illiberal instance of vicarious
liability or justifiable blame for his contribution to atrocity. In what
follows, I argue that complicity falls on the wrong side of these
alternatives, and that consequently, it should collapse along with all other
modes of liability into a single broad notion of perpetration. This, as we
will soon see, promises to transcend a long-endured fixation on modes of
liability within the discipline.
Since its modern revival, international criminal justice has devoted
tremendous energy to the topic of modes of liability, precisely because
international courts are committed to convicting Eichmann (and all the
modern masterminds of atrocity like him) for the violence others have
perpetrated.3 To this end, international criminal courts have crafted a
series of “modes of liability” that treat principal architects of atrocity as
perpetrators (even though masterminds seldom pull the trigger, deploy the
asphyxiants, throw the electrical switch or, to borrow from Eichmann,
break the glass). These new “modes of liability” (such as superior
responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, indirect perpetration and
perpetration through an organization) are necessary, we are told, to
accurately capture the role of the principal architects of atrocity.

3

A large number of international criminal courts expressly profess a commitment to
only prosecuting those ‘who bear the greatest responsibility’ for crimes within their
jurisdiction. See: Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on Establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), art. 1.1, Sierra
Leone-U.N., Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 (“The Special Court shall, except as
provided in subparagraph (2), have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”); ICC Office of the Prosecutor,
Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, Sept. 2003, at 7 (“The
global character of the ICC, its statutory provisions and logistical constraints support a
preliminary recommendation that, as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should
focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the
greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly
responsible for those crimes.”); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Internal Rules (Rev. 4) as revised on 11 September 2009, Preamble (“WHEREAS the
Cambodian authorities have requested assistance from the United Nations in bringing to
trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for
the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian
law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”); For scholarly
opinion endorsing this view, see Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 510 (2003); For a more critical assessment, see Jose E Alvarez, Crimes of
States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999).
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One especially evocative image drives the process. For many, the
dilemma is that the application of everyday rules of criminal attribution
lead to Hitler’s conviction as an accomplice for the Holocaust. The
proposition is simply insupportable since it would “get the moral valences
entirely wrong—almost backwards, in fact.”4 To a large extent, this
perception explains the motivation for adopting novel standards of blame
attribution at the international level. But from the competing perspective,
Eichmann’s last words before the gallows leave a lingering concern modes
of liability that make someone responsible for the acts of others might be
fundamentally unfair. Thus, the development of modes of liability in
international criminal justice reflects a persistent tension between these
two competing extremes: functional attempts at ensuring accountability of
senior masterminds of mass violence versus the very real threat of illiberal
excess.
Initially, international courts looked domestically for solutions to their
moral quandary, borrowing the most permissive “modes of liability” from
domestic criminal systems. Yet in the ensuing years, these “modes of
liability” have generated a flood of criticism. Many scholars have rebuked
international doctrines such as superior responsibility and joint criminal
enterprise as “display[ing] a measure of insensitivity to an actor’s own
personal culpability.”5 The criticism has become so extensive that it may
be fair to say that a majority of scholars view the modes of liability
deployed to solve the Hitler-as-accomplice dilemma as closer to
substantiating Eichmann’s appeal to unfairness than they are to offering a
defensible account of criminal responsibility. This has led to a growing
perception that international criminal courts of various descriptions “risk

4

MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY 85 (2009). The only caveat is that
Osiel’s comment assumes an objective theory of perpetration, whereby the perpetrator is
the person who actually releases the gas into the concentration camps. As we will later
see, the objective theory is theoretically discredited, but this does not undermine Osiel’s
point that rank and file perpetrators are generally viewed as less culpable than their
superiors in international criminal justice.
5
Mirjan Damas̆ ka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
LAW 455, 456 (2001). Aside from Damas̆ ka’s excellent article, the critical literature is
extensive. For some of the best exemplars, see in particular Héctor Olásolo, Reflections
on the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdictional Reach, 16 CRIM. L. FORUM 279
(2005); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005); Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of
International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008); Jens David Ohlin, Three
Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 69 (2007).
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using the accused as an object in a didactic exercise rather than respecting
autonomy and fairness.”6
Strangely, however, complicity has escaped careful theoretical
scrutiny in the scholarly revolt against international modes of liability.7
This is peculiar since complicity, or accessorial liability as it is otherwise
known, is of central relevance to the Hitler-as-accessory dilemma; is
increasingly prominent in international discourse; and most importantly,
also harbors a glaring conceptual anomaly—the doctrine holds the
accomplice liable for the same crime as the perpetrator, even though the
accomplice by definition did not personally carry out the offense.8 To
illustrate, someone convicted of aiding genocide by supplying the
weapons is herself guilty of genocide, even though she never killed a soul.
As John Gardner aptly puts it, “[a]s far as the conviction goes, it is as if
she had pulled the trigger herself.”9 Consequently, this fiction should raise
the alarm that complicity too entails “a dramatic escalation of
responsibility.”10
6

Robinson, supra note 5, at 931.
There is a considerable and important literature dealing with the doctrine and policy of
complicity in international criminal justice, but to my knowledge, none of it explores the
objectionable peripheries of the doctrine. See, for example, Andrew Clapham & Scott
Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 339 (2000) (explaining three categories of policy implication derived
from the application of complicity); LEIV LUNDE, MARK TAYLOR & ANNE HUSER,
COMMERCE OR CRIME? REGULATING ECONOMIES OF CONFLICT (2003) (providing a
helpful synthesis of the law of complicity in sixteen different jurisdictions); Chimène I.
Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008)
(discussing ATCA cases that employ complicity); for a notable exception, see Markus D.
Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 977
(2007) (discussing the need for international criminal justice to craft a law of complicity
specific for its purposes).
8
The French Criminal Law is a good example of this paradox. Article 121-6 of the
French Criminal Codes stipulates that “[s]era puni comme auteur le complice de
l’infraction”. Simultaneously, leading experts define complicity as “un mode
d’imputation dirigé contre une personne qui a aidé à la realization d’une situation
infractionnelle sans pour autant accomplir elle-même aucun des actes visé par le texte
d’incrimination.” JACQUES-HENRI ROBERT, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 343 (6e éd. refondue.
ed. 2005).
9
John Gardner, “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Procure”: an English View of Complicity, in
EINZELVERANTWORTUNG UND MITVERANTWORTUNG IM STRAFRECHT, 228 (Albin Eser,
Barbara Huber, & Karin Cornils eds., 1998). Lord Steyn, of the then British House of
Lords, also put the point succinctly in the Pinochet litigation when he cited “an
elementary principle of law, shared by all civilised legal systems, that there is no
distinction between the man who strikes, and a man who orders another to strike.” Lord
Steyn in R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte,
(1998) 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L) at 54.
10
Damas̆ ka, supra note 5, at 464.
7

2011]

THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY”

7

As I will show, complicity too fails the tests scholars use as
benchmarks in the deconstruction of other modes of liability. And yet
these departures from defensible theory defy hypotheses authors have
offered to explain the origins of harsh international doctrine. To date,
critics have argued that these sorts of conceptual overreach are a
byproduct of an uncomfortable amalgamation of the interpretative cultures
that animate international criminal justice, namely interpretative styles
typical of human rights and law of war; the effect of moral outrage on
interpretative technique; or the broader political aspirations associated
with transitional justice that are said to drive hermeneutics in international
criminal adjudication.11 An analysis of complicity, however, reveals that
this explanation under-appreciates the role of domestic criminal justice in
the development of objectionable international doctrine. In reality,
complicity’s most objectionable characteristics are inherited from
domestic exemplars that national scholars denounce as a conceptual
“disgrace.”12
Let me qualify this criticism from the outset. I do not claim that
domestic criminal law is of no value to international jurisdictions.
International courts will inevitably take inspiration from domestic
standards as practitioners with uniquely criminal law backgrounds (who
are, I suspect, a majority in international criminal justice) draw on
domestic concepts in the day-to-day operation of modern international
criminal courts. This process is entirely unavoidable and by and large
positive—how else could practitioners come to terms with the novelty of
supranational criminal law except through their pre-established experience
of criminal justice? And international criminal justice certainly has much
to learn from this experience. And yet, much of the excellent criticism of
11

Danner and Martinez, supra note 5, at 78 (“International human rights law, domestic
criminal law, and transitional justice. Each one, to varying degrees, informs the purposes
and principles of international prosecution, and their interaction creates conflicts within
international criminal law itself.”); Robinson, supra note 5, at 961 (“Interpretive,
substantive, structural, and ideological assumptions of human rights and humanitarian
law have been absorbed into ICL discourse, distorting methods of reasoning and
undermining compliance with fundamental principles.”) In fairness to Darryl Robinson,
his excellent piece also mentions that this may only be part of the problem and that
domestic systems depart from basic principles too. Robinson, supra note 5, at 927-930;
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND. L. J.
1111 (2011) (observing doubts about tribunals commitments to core principles of justice
“that many domestic legal systems take for granted”, and arguing that “[w]hile greater
reliance on domestic law might not offer a complete solution, it may offer at least one
positive step in ICL’s rediscovery of a criminal law that better aspires to ICL’s liberal
aims.”)
12
Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense? 5
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 427 (2008).
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modes of liability has eagerly pointed out the dark sides of international
doctrine as if domestic systems do not have equivalents, which has
produced a skewed vision of the origins of objectionable international
doctrine. As one prominent expert of domestic criminal law laments,
departures from principle are so consistent in some national systems that
criminal theory may well be “a lost cause.”13
The shortcomings of complicity, however, lead to a wider set of
reflections about modes of liability as a species. If accessorial liability
fails the standards that scholars of international criminal justice erect to
judge other international modes of liability, will there be any mode that
survives the analytical deconstruction? Put differently, could it not be
possible to put an end to the highly complicated, seriously inefficient and
frequently harsh development of modes of liability in international
criminal justice by adopting a unitary theory of perpetration that collapses
all modes of liability into a single standard? On this account of blame
attribution, only a causal contribution and the mental element required for
the offence would be necessary; all those who contribute to international
crimes would be deemed perpetrators, dispensing with all other forms of
legal classification.
The theory is not just conceptually coherent, it is also well suited to
the realities of modern international criminal justice. On the theoretical
plane, many scholars of criminal law are beginning to advocate for the
abandonment of complicity,14 often because they perceive that a proper
conception of perpetration renders complicity “superfluous.”15 These

13

Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 L. Q. REV. 225 (2000).
Michael S. Moore, The Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, in CAUSATION AND
RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 280 (2009); Bob
Sullivan, Principals and Accomplices-A Necessary and Useful Division?, in
FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW, 651 (Anthony Duff &
Christopher Wong eds., 2007); Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1996) (although Kadish does not advocate for the abolition of
complicity, his position is closest to that I advance here); LARRY ALEXANDER &
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 710 (1 ed. 2009) (arguing that insufficient concern is the baseline for all forms of criminal
responsibility); DIETHELM KIENAPFEL, DER EINHEITSTÄTER IM STRAFRECHT (1971);
THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR VON
EINEM DIFFERENZIERENDEN BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIVFUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE (2009).
15
Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2007). The description of complicity as superfluous is overly
forgiving of the violations of theoretical principles complicity presently entails, but in
fairness to Michael Moore, his analysis does not consider the mental element of aiding
and abetting where the most conspicuous violations of culpability occur. Moreover, his
assessment of the physical element does not deal with standards adopted in international
14
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scholarly arguments find practical support in at least five modern domestic
criminal systems from Italy to Brazil, which operate unitary systems of
perpetration that abandon the sorts of “modes of liability” that have
plagued modern international criminal justice.16 Moreover, the unitary
theory also has international precedence—the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals initially dispensed with a distinction between direct perpetration
and accomplice liability entirely.17
Surprisingly then, the unitary theory of perpetration has gone largely
unnoticed in international criminal justice, even as scholars advocate for
its adoption within a less mature system of European criminal law.18
Putting aside the theoretical merits of the concept, an obvious pragmatic
appeal lies in its ability to transcend the numerous inconsistencies between
systems of blame attribution in each of the European systems it
amalgamates. On this basis, one would imagine that the unitary theory
should be all the more attractive internationally given the exponentially
larger number of national systems globally, each of which contains
disparate “modes of liability.” Regrettably, the intensity of the debate

criminal justice, which deviate from basic principles elsewhere. Both these points are
explored further below.
16
The countries are Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Italy and Poland. For further information,
see JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 121, 133 (2e ed. 2002); Kai Ambos,
Development of a Common Substantive Criminal Law for Europe Possible? Some
Preliminary Reflections, 12 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. 173, 182-185 (2005) (setting
out examples from various unitary jurisdictions).
17
Although the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters adopted differentiated doctrines of
complicity, the majority of cases merely considered whether an accused was “concerned
in,” “connected with”, “inculpated in” or “implicated in” international crimes. For a
overview of these cases, see The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Digest of the
Laws and Cases, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOL XV at 49-58.
Like Hector Olásolo, I conclude that this amounts to a unitary theory of perpetration
insofar as it fails to distinguish modes of participation. See OLÁSOLO ET AL., THE
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AS
PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 21 (2010).
18
Johannes Keiler, Towards a European Concept of Participation in Crime, in
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (André Klip ed., 2011);
BETTINA WEIßER, TÄTERSCHAFT IN EUROPA: EIN DISKUSSIONSVORSCHLAG FÜR EIN
EUROPÄISCHES TÄTERMODELL AUF DER BASIS EINER RECHTSVERGLEICHENDEN
UNTERSUCHUNG DER ... FRANKREICHS, ITALIENS UND ÖSTERREICHS (1. Auflage. ed.
2011); WOLFGANG SCHÖBERL, DIE EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT ALS EUROPÄISCHES MODELL:
DIE STRAFRECHTLICHE BETEILIGUNGSREGELUNG IN ÖSTERREICH UND DEN NORDISCHEN
LÄNDERN (1 ed. 2006); Ambos, supra note 17, at 182-185; for rare exceptions to the rule
that scholars do not consider the unitary theory of perpetration for international crimes,
see OLÁSOLO ET AL., supra note 19 at 14-20; E. VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 61–65 (1st Edition. ed. 2003).
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around international modes of liability has obscured a potential solution
hiding in plain sight.
This Article exposes the theory. To begin, Part I introduces criticisms
of superior responsibility and joint criminal enterprise in order to flesh out
the key theoretical objections raised against each of these modes of
liability. Through this process, I isolate conceptual principles that are later
helpful in revealing the objectionable peripheries of complicity. In Part II,
I undertake this exercise by first exploring the identity of complicity in
international criminal justice, then by assessing the mental and physical
elements required for accessorial liability in light of the criticisms of other
modes of liability in the field. I conclude that complicity too falls well
short of the standards used to criticize other “modes of liability,” but that
this arises from the influence of objectionable domestic standards, not the
undeniable pressures of international law or politics.
Having concluded that any defensible concept of complicity requires
complicity and perpetration to share several common elements, Part III
defends the unitary theory in abstract theoretical terms then assesses
pragmatic arguments for applying the standard to international crimes
particularly. I argue that whatever moral significance there might be
between making a difference to a crime and “making a difference to the
difference that principals make”,19 this discrepancy can be adequately
accounted for at the sentencing stage of a criminal trial. The
deconstruction of complicity shows that, at the very least, we must bring it
much closer to perpetration, but my argument is that the characteristics of
international criminal justice militate in favor of allowing complicity to
disintegrate entirely into a unified notion of perpetration in all domestic
and international jurisdictions capable of prosecuting these offenses. What
emerges then, is a preferable account of when we can hold Eichmann and
his many analogues responsible for the glass others broke—without
fallaciously escalating his guilt.
II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CRITICISM OF MODES OF LIABILITY
It is instructive to briefly review the considerable literature criticizing
other modes of liability in international criminal justice in order to isolate
basic tenets of criminal responsibility. I here use the most objectionable
elements of two modes of liability that are often admonished within
international circles in order to identify a framework through which we
might later interrogate complicity.
19

John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. AND PHIL. 127, 128 (2007).
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A Blameworthy Moral Choice: The Mental Element in JCE III

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) holds all those who agree to a common
plan involving the perpetration of a crime responsible for other
foreseeable offences that take place during the execution of the plan.20 I
here use scholarly discussion of the so-called “third” or extended variant
of JCE to introduce fundamental principles about blameworthy moral
choice in international criminal discourse, since so many scholars have
openly deplored JCE III’s tendency to “overpower the restraining force of
the criminal law tradition.”21 While these criticisms appropriately expose
basic principles applicable to mental elements in modes of liability, their
idealized vision of the criminal tradition’s predominantly restraining
character understates the sometimes major gaps between theory and
practice in domestic systems and their effect on the development of
unjustifiable international doctrine.
JCE has three strands. The first “basic” form occurs where “codefendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the same
criminal purpose.”22 An example would be a plan formulated by three
soldiers to torture a detainee, where each of the soldiers carries out a
different role (holding the victim down, preventing others from entering
the room and applying electrodes and controlling the current). This
“basic” form of JCE holds each of the soldiers responsible for the war
crime of torture, even though the men guarding the door and restraining
the victim do not satisfy the elements of the crime—like Eichmann, they
do not personally perform the crime. The second “systematic” form of
joint criminal enterprise is a mere subset of the “basic” form, and
therefore adds little of great salience for present purposes,23 mostly
20

To find individual criminal responsibility pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise, the
elements which must be established are: (i) a plurality of persons; (ii) the existence of a
common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a
crime provided for in the Statute; and (iii) the participation of the accused in the common
plan involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. For a
particularly recent affirmation, see Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Judgment, Case No. IT-0039-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 156–157 (Mar. 17, 2009).
21
Danner and Martinez, supra note 5, at 132.
22
Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 196. Note that this language is not always
consistent: see Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 97 (Feb. 25,
2004) (finding that “[t]he first category is a ‘basic’ form of joint criminal enterprise. It is
represented by cases where all co-perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purposes,
possess the same criminal intention.”).
23
In JCE II, the common plan in JCE I is merely replaced by “an organized criminal
system,” such as an extermination or concentration camp. There is, therefore, general
consensus that this “systematic” category in JCE II is only a subset of the ‘basic’ form in
JCE I. See for instance, Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 203 (“this category of
cases... is really a variant of the first category”); Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No.
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because it also requires that the participants in the enterprise harbor the
necessary intent to torture.
The third variant, however, descends into darker territory. Under JCE
III, all participants in a joint criminal enterprise are responsible for crimes
committed beyond those agreed, provided they are “a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the common purpose.”24 Thus, the soldier
manning the door is also convicted of torturing the victim, even if he
believed he was guarding the entry to prevent enemy soldiers entering and
only foresaw that one of his confederates might commit torture while they
were in the premises.25 The great anomaly is not only that the lookout is
punished for having perpetrated torture even though he did not personally
hurt a fly; it is also that he is convicted based on mere foresight, a standard
well below that defined in the offence for which he is punished. The key
point is that JCE III tolerates a sharp cleavage between the definition of
crimes and modes of liability used to convict defendants of them—the two
categories overlap, but not perfectly.
From whence did the doctrine come? True, the famed Tadić Appeal
Judgment declared JCE III part of customary international law, but this
finding was a mere reiteration of national principles. To the extent that the
court purported to draw on custom, it cited cases convened by British,
Canadian, American Military Tribunals applying Control Council Law
No. 10, as well as domestic courts within Italy, all of which originally
applied national concepts of attribution.26 And in any event, the ICTY
explicitly affirmed that, “international criminal rules on common purpose
[i.e. JCE] are substantially rooted in, and to a large extent reflect, a
position taken by many States of the world in their national legal

IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 82 (Feb. 28, 2005) (describing JCE II as “a variant of the first
form”); Kai Ambos, Amicus Curiae Brief in the Matter of the Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal of
the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek Eav “Duch” Dated 8 August 2008, 20 CRIM. L.
FORUM 353, 374 (2009) (concluding that JCEII can be viewed as an element of JCE I if
interpreted narrowly).
24
Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., supra note 20, at 83.
25
In fact, there is good authority for the idea that the standard is actually objective
foreseeability, lowering the mental element required for JCEIII even further. See Antonio
Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 109, 121 (2007) (arguing that most courts
actually apply an objective standard of foreseeability for JCEIII).
26
Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 204. For discussion, see Verena Haan, The
Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 167, 177 (2005). For other
arguments that JCE is an outgrowth of the US concept of Pinkerton liability, see George
P. Fletcher, New Court, Old Dogmatik, 9 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 187 (2011),.
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systems.”27 Therefore, to the extent that international criminal courts and
tribunals are applying controversial standards of attribution like JCEIII, it
is largely because they have imitated national equivalents.
The critics, however, have shown JCE III no mercy, largely on the
grounds that the incongruity between the mental element for the mode and
that required for the crime leads to a violation of the principle of
culpability.28 Traditionally the offshoot of retributivism, culpability
reflects a commitment to the idea that an individual’s punishment must be
calibrated to her personal desert.29 The immediate retort (that I heard many
times from Anglo-American lawyers in practice) is that this focus on
culpability is overly academic when national systems depart from the
principle as a matter of course. If JCE III solves the Hitler-as-accomplice
dilemma and furthers the noble aspirations of the international justice
project,30 why should international courts moderate their use of the
doctrine when so many major Western jurisdictions apply an identical
concept?
In simple terms, guilt matters. An individual cannot be instrumentally
punished to pursue even noble policy goals. Although this notion dates at
least to Kant, in the English-speaking tradition, H.L.A Hart famously
reconciled it with utilitarian theories of punishment by pointing out a
disparity between the objectives of the criminal system as a whole and the

27

Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 193. In support of this proposition, the Tribunal
cited law from France, Italy, England and Wales, Canada, the United States, Australia
and Zambia that also criminalize a version of JCE III, id. at 224.
28
Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 159, 174 (2007) (concluding that relative to other aspects of JCE, “the conflict of
JCE III with the principle of culpability is more fundamental”); George P. Fletcher &
Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur
Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 548 (2005) (arguing that “the doctrine [JCE] itself is
substantively overbroad and transgresses basic principles of legality that limit
punishment to personal culpability.”); Ohlin, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the violation
of culpability occasioned by punishing different degrees of contribution equally); Danner
and Martinez, supra note 5, at 134 (arguing that JCE poses significant challenges to the
culpability principle).
29
In a sense, desert is synonymous with meritocracy. If an individual performs well in an
exam, she deserves an excellent mark. If she kills her mother, she deserves punishment.
For more on the positive and negative notions of desert, see JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55 (1974). See also PAUL H.
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED,
HOW MUCH? 135 (2008) (discussing vengeful, deontological and empirical concepts of
desert).
30
Mirjan Damas̆ ka, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice? 83 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 329 (2008); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal
Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 561 (2002).
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principles to be employed in attributing blame in concrete cases.31 He
illustrates the distinction with a striking example—even if your rationale
for punishment within the system generally is deterrence, it is clearly
morally vulgar to punish family members of those who carried out
criminal offenses, even if doing so has massive deterrent effects.32 In a
similar example of greater salience for international criminal justice,
George Fletcher chillingly recalls that “[a]s the National Socialists well
knew in controlling inmates in slave labour camps, occasionally hanging
an innocent person effectively deters disobedience by other inmates.”33
Quite clearly, punishment without culpability is anathema to liberal
notions of criminal law, even if it does promote deterrence or other
desirable outcomes.
Therefore, culpability is central to any theoretically justifiable account
of criminal responsibility, from retributivism to restorative justice.34 True,
advocates of restorative criminal justice may calculate guilt slightly
differently,35 but they are still committed to the notion that “only the
31

According to Hart, “[w]hat is needed is the realization that different principles (each of
which may in a sense be called a ‘justification’ [for punishment]) are relevant at different
points in any morally acceptable account of punishment.” Furthermore, “it is perfectly
consistent to assert both that the General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment is
its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this General Aim should be qualified
or restricted out of deference to principles of Distribution which require that punishment
should be only of an offender for an offense.” See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3, 9 (Rev. ed. 1984) (emphasis in
original).
32
Id. at 5-6.
33
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 415 (1978).
34
For a helpful overview of the different intensities of retribution and their intersection
with utilitarian justifications for criminal law, see Alexander and Ferzan, supra note 15,
at 7-10 (discussing weak, moderate and strong conceptions of retributivism); for a
summary of similar thinking in German criminal theory, see VOLKER KREY, 1
DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT : ALLGEMEINER TEIL 118 (2002) (discussing dominant theories
of punishment in German criminal law, none of which advocate extending liability
beyond an individual’s desert).
35
Since restorative fault emphasizes a defendant’s responsibility for rectifying harm he
has caused, John Braithwaite has argued that assessments of fault should be moved from
their current point of assessment at the time the crime is perpetrated, “to fault based on
how restoratively the offender acts after the crime.” John Braithwaite, Intention versus
Reactive Fault, in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 345 (Ngaire Naffine, Rosemary J.
Owens, & John Matthew Williams eds., 2001). Few courts have adopted restorative
theories of punishment in cases involving international crimes, such that Braithwaite’s
vision of culpability is less germane for present purposes. This leaves open the question
whether, in preferencing some version of retributive punishment, international criminal
lawyers may have “hitched themselves to a dead horse.” GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR
AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137
(2007).

2011]

THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY”

15

guilty should be punished.”36 In fact, these philosophical commitments are
so widely held that Mirjan Damas̆ ka plausibly claims that “if one were to
catalog general principles of law so widely recognized by the community
of nations that they constitute a subsidiary source of public international
law, the culpability principle would be one of the most serious candidates
for inclusion in the list.”37 And yet, while this is true at the level of
principle, it overlooks states’ sometimes prolific abdication from
theoretical standards in practice and the genealogy of JCE in national law.
Unsurprisingly, international criminal courts mimic this schizophrenic
relationship with culpability. When addressing the concept in abstract
terms, they also adopt a formal rendition of the culpability principle,
insisting that “the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of
personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts
or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some way
participated”.38 The pledge is laudable but it also omits half the concept.
An individual is culpable, not just because she participated in criminal acts
or transactions, but also because she made a blameworthy moral choice to
do so.39 So already the tremendous incidence of strict liability crimes
within Anglo-American jurisdictions reveals a great distance between
Damas̆ ka’s understandable appeal to culpability and the practice of states
that habitually disregard it.40
36

JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 168 (1993) (“We agree with the negative retributivists, for republican
reasons, that indeed only the guilty ought to be punished.”).
37
Damas̆ ka, supra note 5, at 470.
38
Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 186; Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL
04-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 15 (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, supra note 22, at 29.
Strikingly, the better formulation was at Nuremberg: the Tribunal claimed that its
reasoning was “in accordance with well-settled legal principles, one of the most
important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishments should be
avoided.” 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 499 (1947).
39
MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 403 (2010)
(acknowledging the dual meanings of culpability, but emphasizing that responsibility
entails a voluntary and unjustified act that proximately causes harm, coupled with the
obligation that “one must have done so culpably”). Fletcher, supra note 27, at 461
(stipulating that the components of desert are wrongdoing and culpability). Note that
culpability bears several meanings here. On the one hand, it is frequently used in a
normative sense i.e. a person is culpable only if she is justifiably to blame for her
conduct, as compared with the use of the term culpability in the US Model Penal Code to
designate mental elements. For further discussion, see id., at 398.
40
It is difficult to reconcile the extent of strict liability in many Anglo-American national
systems with the view frequently expressed in international criminal scholarship that
national departures from culpability are highly exceptional. In a survey of 165 new
offenses created within England and Wales in 2005, Andrew Ashworth shows that strict
liability was sufficient in 40%, plus an additional 26% were strict liability but watered
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How then is culpability to be measured? To begin, note that the
content of requisite blameworthy choice varies from one international
crime to the next. Indeed, the availability of different mental elements
allows states, treaty-makers and sometimes judges to define crimes in
such a way that each prohibits distinct moral transgressions. For some
crimes, recklessness or negligence will suffice, whereas others are
markedly more demanding in order to signal the particular moral
magnitude of the violation. In the context of genocide, for instance, the
requisite choice is not simply to kill individuals; it also involves carrying
out these acts with a corresponding intention to “destroy, in whole or in
part, a racial, ethnic, or religious group.”41 For many, this added
psychological disposition is the quintessence of the crime—it is the
element that distinguishes garden-variety murder from what Raphael
Lemkin described as “barbarous practices reminiscent of the darkest pages
of history.”42
One would think then that convicting someone of genocide without
this special intent emasculates the crime. And yet, international courts
have found that a member of a JCE could be found to have committed
genocide, even though he merely foresaw that his colleagues might carry
out the crime.43 For many scholars, this is theoretical heresy. David
Nersessian, for example, describes JCE III as a form of “constructive
liability”,44 a term he uses in contrast to direct forms of liability, because
“theories of constructive liability… allow conviction for the same offense
down slightly by a proviso that the offense must be carried out “without reasonable
excuse.” Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Law, Human Rights and Preventative Justice, in
REGULATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE FUTURES OF
CRIMINAL LAW (Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie, & Simon Bronitt eds., 2008). Strict
liability is just the tip of the iceberg. For a wide range of violations of culpability in the
United States, see Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 617–
618 (1983) (discussing Pinkerton liability, the felony-murder rule, vicarious liability of
officials of organizations, RICO and others).
41
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
S. EXEC. DOC. O 81-1 (1949) ,78 U.N.T.S. 277, in Article II.
42
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 90 (2008).
43
Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 6
(Mar. 19, 2004) (holding that even when the crime charged is genocide, “the Prosecution
will be required to establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to the accused that an act
specified in Article 4(2) would be committed and that it would be committed with
genocidal intent”.). For similar conclusions relating to other special intent crimes, see
Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 471 (Feb. 26, 2009)
(convicting Šainović of persecution for the murder of Kosovo Albanians “even though
falling outside of the object of the JCE, [the murders carried act to persecute were]
reasonably forseeable to Šainović.”).
44
David L. Nersessian, Whoops, I Committed Genocide - The Anomaly of Constructive
Liability for Serious International Crimes, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 82 (2006).
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even though the requisite conduct and mental state are absent.”45 In
articulating what makes these mechanisms objectionable, Nersessian
draws on the principle of fair labeling.46 The concept was originally
developed by Andrew Ashworth to describe the need for specificity in the
label of a particular offense, rather than lumping together vastly different
categories of offending.47 Even though this original purpose is less
germane here, the underlying idea was that “[f]airness demands that
offenders be labeled and punished in proportion to their wrongdoing.”48
Otherwise, an accused is stigmatized by preconceptions associated with an
offence that do not match his personal responsibility.
While I doubt that fair labeling (in the sense critics of international
criminal justice use it) deserves an existence separate from culpability, it
does alert us to an important insight—the label of a crime is a key element
of punishment that must match an accused’s guilt, regardless of the
number of years in prison an accused is to serve.49 This reading reinforces
that conviction for a particular crime requires fidelity to its identity, which
predictably, is contained in the crime’s definition. The physical and
mental elements in the paradigm of the offence thus define what it means
to be responsible for violating that prescription. Accordingly, convicting
an individual of genocide for merely foreseeing the crime over-punishes.
It misapplies the criminal label genocide, which is reserved for more
45

Id. at 82. What this thoughtful criticism does not reveal is how aiding and abetting is
also constructive, and that this point was instrumental in leading international courts to
define JCE III similarly. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 43, at 5, 8 (“As a mode of
liability, the third category of joint criminal enterprise is no different from other forms of
criminal liability which do not require proof of intent to commit a crime on the part of an
accused before criminal liability can attach. Aiding and abetting, which requires
knowledge on the part of the accused and substantial contribution with that knowledge, is
but one example.”).
46
Id. at 96-98.
47
Andrew Ashworth, The Elasticity of Mens Rea, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS, 53-56 (Colin Tapper ed.,) (referring to
“representing labelling” as “the belief that the label applied to an offence ought fairly to
represent the offender’s wrongdoing.” Ashworth’s prototypical illustration was the
impropriety of merging the hitherto separate crimes of theft and obtaining by deception,
which were thought to convey separate moral wrongs.); For further discussion, see also
Glanville Williams, Convictions and Fair Labelling, 42 CAMBRIDGE L..J. 85 (1983);
James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MODERN L. REV.
217 (2008). To my mind, this principle does not enjoy a separate existence from
culpability. This, because the label of a criminal conviction is a key component of a
defendant’s punishment, and therefore must be reconciled with desert.
48
Ashworth, supra note 47, at 53-56 (Referring to “representing labeling” as “the belief
that the label applied to an offence ought fairly to represent the offender’s wrongdoing.”).
49
James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick make this point well in describing the preferences
of rape victims to have their assailants prosecuted for rape, even if this leads to lesser
jail-terms. See Chalmers & Leverick, supra note 47, at 217.
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blameworthy conduct, then mis-conveys a degree of responsibility that is
not paired to the defendant’s desert.
As Darryl Robinson convincingly argues, this is an aberration: “the
[defendant] still faces the stigma of a conviction for committing genocide,
while having satisfied neither the actus reus nor the hitherto indispensable
mens rea for genocide”.50 The approach transgresses principles of
culpability and fair labeling “by lumping together radically different levels
of blameworthiness under one label.”51 While I am less convinced that
international influences explain this position (as distinct from a
combination of the Hitler-as-accomplice dilemma and readily available
domestic tools like JCE), we are likely to share deep misgivings about the
national justifications for the doctrine—calculating culpability as “a
package deal”52 still escalates responsibility on policy grounds.
Jenny Martinez and Allison Marsten Danner also propose that “certain
forms of joint criminal enterprise… that tolerate a reduced mens rea
should not be used in cases involving specific intent crimes such as
genocide and persecution.”53 Here too, there is a concern that the
distinctive features of these serious crimes are “weakened by the lowering
of the mental state to recklessness or negligence, as would occur in a
Category Three JCE”.54 Although Martinez and Danner recommend closer
attention to the principle of culpability in international criminal justice in
50

Robinson, supra note 5, at 941.
Id., at 941.
52
Andrew Simester offers arguably the most famous defense of joint criminal liability at
the national level. See A.P. Simester, The Mental Element in Complicity, 122 L.Q. REV.
578, 599 (2006) (“[b]y forming a joint enterprise, S signs up to its goal. In so doing, she
accepts responsibility for the wrongs perpetrated in realising that goal, even though they
be done by someone else. Her joining with P in a common purpose means that she is no
longer fully in command of how the purpose is achieved. Given that P is an autonomous
agent, S cannot control the precise manner in which P acts. Yet her commitment to the
common purpose implies an acceptance of the choices and actions that are taken by P in
the course of realizing that purpose. Her responsibility for incidental offences is not
unlimited: S cannot be said to accept the risk of wrongs by P that she does not foresee, or
which depart radically from their shared enterprise, and joint enterprise liability rightly
does not extend to such cases. Within these limitations, however, the execution of the
common purpose-including its foreseen attendant risks-is a package deal. Just as risks
attend the pursuit of the common purpose, an assumption of those risks flows from S’s
subscription to that purpose.”); See also, George Fletcher’s helpful outline of the
common justification for felony-murder. GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1998) (“The state justifiably threatens robbers who cause death with
an additional punishment in order to make them, as it were, ”careful“ robbers-they should
do everything possible to minimize the risk of death. Imposing this additional burden on
them is not considered unjust, for they, as robbers, have embarked on a forbidden course
of endangering human life.”).
53
Danner and Martinez, supra note 5, at 79.
54
Id., at 151.
51
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order to bolster a fragile legitimacy, promote human rights and achieve
transitional justice goals,55 their critique also underscores more
deontological concerns for fairness to the accused—using JCE III to
circumvent special intent inappropriately amplifies moral responsibility
beyond the contours of the crime.
A final set of scholars reach the same conclusion, albeit on slightly
different grounds. Antonio Cassese, for instance, argues that JCEIII may
not be employed in conjunction with special intent crimes for two very
compelling reasons.56 First, to do so would connote a “logical
impossibility”,57 since one may not be held responsible for committing a
crime that requires special intent unless that individual is proved to have
the requisite special intent.58 Second, he convincingly argues that the
“distance” between the subjective dispositions of the primary and
secondary offenders must not be dramatic if they are both to be convicted
of the same offense, otherwise personal culpability “would be torn to
shreds.”59
Thus, to preserve analytical consistency, all modes of liability must
require subjective standards that are the same as those announced in the
definition of each particular crime. Otherwise, modes of liability warp
responsibility as distinct form merely attributing wrongdoing in line with
the moral weight of the crime in question.
B.

The Fundamentals of Action: Failures to Punish in Superior
Responsibility

At the turn of the seventeenth century, the famed internationalist Hugo
Grotius wrote, “we must accept the principle that he who knows of a
crime, and is able and bound to prevent it but fails to do so, himself
commits a crime.”60 The statement represented the beginnings of the
55

Id. at 146.
Cassese, supra note 25, at 121.
57
Id. at 121.
58
Id. at 121.
59
Id. at 121; Elies van Sliedregt also explains this difference based on a distinction
between perpetration and participation. The former forbids escalation whereas the later
tolerates this. Elies van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting
Individuals for Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 184 -207, 201 (2007). I later argue that
if such a distinction makes little sense, since it is still inappropriate to convict someone of
a crime they do not deserve, even if you have reduced the time they will spend in prison.
See infra section IV.A.
60
HUGO GROTIUS ET AL., HUGONIS GROTII DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES: IN QUIBUS
JUS NATURAE & GENTIUM, ITEM JURIS PUBLICI PRÆCIPUA EXPLICANTUR 523 (1925).
56
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modern doctrine of superior responsibility, but again it was not until
domestic courts prosecuted the Japanese General Yamashita after WWII,61
that the doctrine began its meteoric rise to prominence within international
criminal justice. The doctrine’s modern popularity has stemmed, in large
part, from its promise as a solution to the Hitler-as-accessory dilemma. To
this end, superior responsibility must function as a mechanism through
which the superior is deemed liable “for the crimes of his subordinates.”62
Accordingly, superior responsibility emerged as a “mode of liability” with
domestic backing that promised to overcome the insurmountable
deficiencies of complicity and accurately capture the true moral
responsibility of the puppet masters in atrocity.
Once again, the origins of the concept were largely domestic. To
conclude a meticulous study of WWII jurisprudence governing superior
responsibility (which in turn served as a foundation for modern iterations),
Kevin Heller observes that “[n]one of the [WWII] tribunals, however,
identified the precise ‘law of war’—conventional or customary—that
justified imposing criminal liability on a military commander who failed
to properly supervise his subordinates, much less on a civilian superior.
Instead, they simply cited Yamashita, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1949, for the existence of the mode of participation.”63 Much has
transpired since, but this history undermines a thesis that broad modes of
liability are necessarily hatched internationally. Quite the contrary,
international courts enthusiastically embrace far-reaching doctrine once
prominent domestic systems grant them their imprimatur.
Confusingly, there are several definitions of superior responsibility
within international criminal law, but crudely speaking, a subordinate’s
wrongdoing is attributed to the superior where she has effective control
over the perpetrators of crimes and knew or had reason to know of their
offenses, but failed to prevent or punish the perpetrators.64 Only a decade
61

In Re: Yamashita 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946). For a detailed history of the case, see RICHARD
L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW (1982).
62
Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, ¶ 53 (Nov. 16, 2005); Amy J.
Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International
Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 251, 267 (2008) (completing a survey of previous practice by
concluding that “there is overwhelming support for the mode of liability view.”).
63
KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 262–263 (2011).
64
For instance, Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute states: “The fact that any of the acts
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does
not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that
the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
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ago, however, Mirjan Damas̆ ka alerted us that aspects of the old concept
are inconsistent with first principles—convicting a superior of the same
offence as his subordinate for merely failing to punish that subordinate
violates the principle of culpability too,65 in this instance, because “the
opprobrium attaches to [the superior] for heinous conduct to which he has
in no way contributed”.66 Underlying Damas̆ ka’s complaint lies the
supposition that culpability presupposes personal participation in the
wrongful conduct required for the crime of which the accused is
convicted.67
Let us embark on a brief exegesis to explore the significance of this
idea. Wrongful action requires that a defendant’s actions “must reflect on
him in a way that makes the kind of criticism communicated by the
imposition of criminal responsibility appropriate.”68 Murder requires
actions that lead to death, rape requires insertion of a penis in a vagina,
theft demands appropriation, and so forth. There can be no mix and
match—an appropriation cannot be a murder and a killing cannot be theft.
Thus, it is not acceptable that someone convicted of a crime did something
morally reprehensible, if that action has no bearing on the content of the
offense with which she is charged. These principles reflect basic liberal
aspirations—in order to guard against the prospect of thought-crimes, guilt
by association or punishment based on status, a wrongful act calibrated to
the definition of the crime is widely regarded as “a primary candidate for a
universal principle of criminal liability.”69
In traditional understandings, wrongful acts tend to divide into two
camps. For one category of offences such as rape and fraud, conduct alone
is sufficient since the action itself constitutes the criminal harm.70 To
perpetrators thereof.” (Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Article 7(2), Sept. 2008).
65
Damas̆ ka, supra note 5, at 468.
66
Id. at 468.
67
Id. at 469.
68
Victor Tadros, for instance, points out that it is not sufficient that the defendant has
acted wrongly in some way; as a minimum his actions “must reflect on him in a way that
makes the kind of criticism communicated by the imposition of criminal responsibility
appropriate.” VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 49 (2007) (emphasis in
original).
69
Fletcher, supra note 26, at 420.
70
See Fletcher, supra note 26, at 61-62 (describing a basic cleavage in the criminal law,
between crimes of harmful consequences and crimes of harmful actions). Fletcher’s
taxonomy elsewhere refers to patterns of manifest criminality, harmful consequences and
subjective criminality (Fletcher, supra note 26, at 388-390). The last of these labels
describes inchoate offenses, and therefore is not directly relevant here; This tripartite
taxonomy emulates German criminal theory (Krey, supra note 34, at 151-153, discussing
Erfolgsdelikte (result-oriented crimes), schlichte Tätigkeitsdelikte (non-result oriented
crimes); and Verletzungsdelikte/Gefährdungsdelikte (crimes constituted by violation of
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extrapolate into the international sphere, the war crime declaring that no
quarter will be given merely requires the order not to take prisoners—it
matters not whether injured or surrendering enemy soldiers are
subsequently massacred in Lawrence of Arabia style, since the
announcement itself suffices to commit the crime. In the second category
of crimes, however, proof of harmful consequences is required. And for
these harm-type crimes, “a causal connexion between some action of the
accused and the specified harm must be shown in order to establish the
existence of liability.”71
Two contrasting theories question this traditional thinking from
opposing extremes, both of which are useful for understanding
international criminal law’s philosophical stance on these issues. From
one side, there are those who deny the conduct/harm division outright,
arguing that causation is a quintessential element of responsibility across
all criminal offences.72 Rape is not restricted to the conduct of inserting
one’s penis into a woman’s vagina without consent, but denotes “causing
sexual penetration of the female.”73 By analogy, the war crime of
declaring no quarter is actually causing bodily movements in the throat,
legal interests/mere endangerment of legal interests). The same distinction is true in both
French and Spanish criminal law. See ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 105 (2002) (describing a distinction between “delito de mera actividad”
and “delito de resultado” in the former, and “infraction formelle” and “infraction
materielle” in the latter.).
71
H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 79 (2nd ed. 1985) (emphasis
in original).
72
The criticism of the traditionalist division between conduct and harm type offenses is
best made in MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW,
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 101 (2009) ("The thesis is that all complex descriptions of
actions share with `killing’ a built-in, second causal element: the bodily movement (that
is caused by a volition) must itself cause some further, independent event to occur, like a
death in the case of `killing’.); But see John Gardner, Moore on Complicity and
Causation, 156 U. PA L. REV. PENNUMBRA 432 (2008) (disagreeing that rape requires
causation, because the offence demands “no result... other than the action in question
having been performed”). My own sympathies lie with Moore. Consider this
hypothetical: if a patient is given an anesthetic in her arm before an operation, and a
doctor asks her to raise her arm, she tries but fails because the arm is anesthetized. If the
doctor asks her to raise her anesthetized arm a second time, but this time the doctor
physically raises the patient’s arm at precisely the same time she makes her second
attempt, we are still not able to say that the patient lifted her arm, even though she
intended to raise it at precisely the same time that it did. Volition must cause action,
therefore causation is common to all forms of responsibility. For helpful discussion,
including arguments that would disagree with my hypothetical, see R. A. Duff, Acting,
Trying, and Criminal Liability, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 75-106, 83-85
(Stephen Shute, John Gardner, & Jeremy Horder eds., New ed. 1995).
73
MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS 16 (2009).
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mouth and lips, which subsequently cause an announcement to one’s
troops that no prisoners will be taken in battle. On this account of the
philosophy of action, one can never escape causal analyses, even for what
are commonly known as conduct-type crimes. The distinction between
conduct and harm therefore disintegrates, leaving causation as a universal
ingredient in blame attribution.
Others reach the diametrically opposite conclusion by denying
causation any legitimate role in determining responsibility. These
arguments rely heavily on thinking about moral luck—if we are
committed to punishing people for what they deserve, surely they should
not benefit from their luck.74 Why, after all, should a would-be murderer
who shoots at her enemy be punished less, merely because the victim by
chance dies of a heart attack seconds before the bullet hits?75 If we are
serious about culpability as the metric upon which to judge responsibility,
we must eliminate these types of fortuitous scenarios from our calculus.
To do this requires nothing short of abolishing harm as a touchstone for
criminal responsibility, and as a result, eliminating causation from the
criminal lexicon. In its place, criminal offenses would always be inchoate
in structure, making attempt the paradigm for criminal responsibility.
As a reflection of the inherent deference to domestic orthodoxy,
international courts and tribunals reject both extremes. To illustrate, in
determining the liability of leaders within the infamous Radio télévision
libre des mille collines (RTLM) for instigating genocide, the Rwanda
Tribunal distinguished instigation as a “mode of liability” from direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, which operates as a separate
inchoate crime. Like the conduct-type war crime of declaring no quarter,
the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide “is
completed as soon as the discourse in question is uttered or published”.76
Whereas a showing of causation would be required to convict the radio
owners for instigating genocide, for this inchoate crime a “causal
74

For the classic discussion of this in English-speaking literature, see Thomas Nagel,
Moral Luck, Supp 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELEAN SOCIETY (1976); For more
recent discussion, see Andrew Ashworth, Taking the Consequences, in ACTION AND
VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 107 (Stephen Shute, John Gardner, & Jeremy Horder eds.,
1995); Alexander and Ferzan, supra note 15, at 171-175.
75
For an excellent overview of these arguments, see Alexander and Ferzan, supra note
15 at 171-196 (arguing that only culpability, not resulting harm, affects desert"). For a
response to these claims, which asserts the orthodox position that harm matters, see
Moore, supra note 73, at 30 (arguing that we feel very differently about a drunk driver’s
responsibility for swerving and only missing a child crossing the street by an inch, than
we do if the drunk driver actually hits and kills the child.).
76
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶ 723 (Nov. 28,
2007).
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relationship is not requisite to a finding of incitement.”77 So in contrast to
the theory that causation represents the hidden structure of all criminal
responsibility, international courts side with domestic example.
Likewise, arguments from moral luck have no real currency
internationally—harm indisputably matters in international criminal
justice. All range of international crimes, from deportation as a war crime
to extermination as a crime against humanity, are defined in ways that
make the actual occurrence of harm necessary for guilt. For the former,
civilians must be expelled across a border; for the latter, members of a
civilian population must perish.78 In some instances, international courts
explicitly reinforce the normative significance of harm by explicitly
stating that international crimes are not inchoate and that liability is
contingent upon proof that the intended harm materialized.79 In sum,
international criminal justice is highly deferential to domestic tradition,
both in its practice of distinguishing harm-type and conduct-type offences
along traditional lines and in considering harm a theoretical center-piece
of criminal responsibility.
But why the mimicry? If we are truly committed to culpability as the
guiding feature of blame attribution in international criminal justice,
should we not have boldly dispensed with harm as the essence of
international criminal responsibility, in favor of a system that better
accounts for the problem of moral luck? Less ambitiously, is it not more
77

Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1015 (Dec. 3,
2003); this aspect of the Trial Chamber’s reasoning was affirmed on appeal. See
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., supra note 76, at 678; for a concise articulation of the
difference between instigation as mode of liability and incitement as inchoate offence,
see Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (June 20, 2009)
(“Instigation under Article 6 (1) is a mode of liability; an accused will incur criminal
responsibility only if the instigation in fact substantially contributed to the commission of
one of the crimes under Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute. By contrast, direct and public
incitement is itself a crime, requiring no demonstration that it in fact contributed in any
way to the commission of acts of genocide.”).
78
“(1) The perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of
life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population; (2) The conduct
constituted, or took place as part of a mass killing of members of a civilian population.”
Elements of Crimes, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New York, 3-10 September
2002 [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes], at 6; “The perpetrator deported or transferred
one or more persons to another State or to another location.” Id., at 17.
79
Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., supra note 43, at 92 (“liability for aiding and abetting
under the Statute cannot be inchoate: the accused cannot be held responsible under
Article 7(1) for aiding and abetting if a crime or underlying offence is never actually
carried out with his assistance, encouragement, or moral support.”); Prosecutor v.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ¶ 378 (May 15, 2003) (“Article 6(1) does
not criminalize inchoate offences”.).
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coherent to dispense with the traditional distinction between harm-type
and conduct-type offences, to acknowledge that causation is common to
both? That international criminal justice adopts neither of these positions
again reflects the pull of domestic influence, not some nefarious utilitarian
agenda derived from its international political status. The absence of any
domestic practice adopting these theories has obviated the need for
international criminal jurisdictions to choose between competing models,
leaving them to contentedly follow established domestic doctrine
regardless of whether it accords with principle.
This leads us back to superior responsibility, where international
criminal justice’s traditionalism plays out most keenly. To begin, we must
acknowledge that one might dispute whether superior responsibility is the
ideal illustration of these philosophical principles in action insofar as it
involves liability for an omission. There is broad dispute in criminal
theory whether omissions cause anything. On the on hand, there are those
who consider that an omission is “nothing at all,”80 which gives rise to the
conclusion that omissions cannot cause anything—“nothing comes of
nothing, and nothing ever could.”81 Conversely, social theories of
causation posit that we ordinarily explain omissions as having causal
power.82 We have no problem, for instance, saying that “a lack of rain
causes crops to fail.”83 The debate need not delay us here though, since
both judicial and scholarly discussions of superior responsibility assume a
causal structure, and perhaps more pertinently, the question is largely
peripheral to our central focus on accessorial liability.
How then do these foundational principles play own within superior
responsibility? Intriguingly, misgivings about causation have prompted
international courts to offer two corrections to the law governing failures
to punish. The first is largely cosmetic—in response to the complaint that
failures to punish convicted defendants of harm-type offenses without
establishing causation, international criminal courts began adding
language to the pertinent sections of their judgments professing that “an
accused is not charged with the crimes of his subordinates but with his
failure to carry out his duty as a superior to exercise control.”84 This
language, however, has proved more of a smokescreen to ward off

80

Moore, supra note 73, at 55.
Id., See also, I; HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES
STRAFRECHTS. ALLGEMEINER TEIL. 618 (1996) (also doubting that omissions are causal
insofar as they lack “a real source of energy.”)
82
GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 64 (1998).
83
VICTOR TADROS, supra note 68, at 171-172 (2007).
84
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 171 (Sept. 17, 2003).
81
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conceptual criticisms than a marked normative change,85 but the important
point is that the rhetoric became important to quell theoretical unease with
the doctrine’s overreach, and that causation was the grounds for the
discomfort.
In contrast, the second judicial correction was more radical.
Several Trial Chambers convicted military commanders of a separate
offence of “failing to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
punish”,86 then proceeded to hand down drastically reduced sentences
commensurate with the commanders’ failure to act (as distinct from the
harm associated with a crime such as torture, extermination or
genocide).87 This transformation of superior responsibility from a mode of
liability to a separate lesser conduct-type crime was born of major
theoretical misgivings—there is no logically plausible means of
reconciling failures to punish with causation.88 How, after all, can a
commander cause a crime that is already complete by the time she is
impelled to act? The solution then was to dispense with causation by
transforming failures to punish into a form closer to attempt.
For the same reasons, the vast majority of academics agree that
failures to punish must constitute a separate conduct-type offense, given
the impossibility of the commander’s failure causing the subordinate’s
crime.89 With respect to a crime subordinates have already committed,
85

I view this language as largely cosmetic because it conceals the long history of holding
the superior responsible “for the crimes of his subordinates,” and more significantly,
belies the ongoing practice of using superior responsibility to convict military and
civilian commanders of “rape,” “pillage” and “genocide” carried out by underlings. For
instance, “The Accused Ljubomir Borovčanin is found GUILTY pursuant to Article 7(3)
of the Statute, of the following counts: Count 4: Murder, as a crime against humanity.”;
Prosecutor v. Popović et. al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 835, (June 10, 2010).
Thus, it seem clear that the superior is still convicted of the crime his subordinates
perpetrated. For a more detailed confirmation of this reasoning, see Robinson, supra note
5, at 951-952.
86
Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶ 620-628
(Mar. 15, 2006) (finding Amir Kubura, for instance, “GUILTY of failing to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to punish the murder of Mladen Havranek at the
Slavonija Furniture Salon in Bugojno on 5 August 1993.” The judgment’s entire
disposition followed this approach).
87
Id. at 625, 627.(sentencing Enver Hadzihasanovic to 5 years imprisonment and Amir
Kubura to 2.5 years for failing to prevent or punish war crimes).
88
Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgment, ¶ 38 (Apr.
22, 2008); citing Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 77 (Jul. 29,
2004); Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 832 (Dec.
17, 2004).
89
Thomas Weigend, Bemerkungen zur Vorgesetztenverantwortlichkeit im
Völkerstrafrecht, 116 BEMERKUNGEN ZUR VORGESETZTENVERANTWORTLICHKEIT IM
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT 999, 1021 (2004); Bing Bing Jia, The Doctrine of Command
Responsibility Revisited, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004), (“[b]ut it makes no sense to see
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causality is “logically impossible” since later events cannot cause earlier
ones.90 And as far as future crimes go, giving failures to punish a separate
existence where crimes have yet to occur would require an absurdity: “to
initiate prosecution of a crime that has not yet been committed.” 91 On this
basis, the problem of causation within failures to punish “has not and
arguably cannot be resolved.”92 In sum total, using failure to punish as a
vehicle for convicting the superior of the same offence as the subordinate
is “largely disproportionate.” 93
Admittedly, a minority of scholars in international criminal justice do
reach the opposite view, but strikingly, their disagreement consistently
attempts to reconcile failures to punish with causation rather than simply
denying that the concept is necessary.94 Otto Triffterer, for example,
argues that failures to punish are based on a double causal connection to
the offense: the first flows from the superior’s initial omission to control
the subordinates; the second derives from the failure to exercise a “second
chance” to absolve himself by referring the matter to justice.95 Many find

failure to punish in the same light, which should be treated as an offence independent of
subordinate crimes that raise the issue of command responsibility in the first place.”);
Robinson, supra note 5, at 951 (“[e]ven if we agree that failure to punish crimes is
worthy of criminalization, it is simply inaccurate to label such a failure as ‘genocide’.”);
Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of
Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 619, 636
(2007), (“with regard to the failure to punish, where no real causal link subsists between
the subsequent failure to act of the superior and the crime previously committed, the
conviction of the superior for the same crime committed by the subordinates is difficult
to justify.”); Elies van Sliedregt, Article 28 of the ICC Statute: Mode of Liability and/or
Separate Offense, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 420, 431-432 (2009) (arguing that superior
responsibility has different structures in different jurisdictions, but recommending the
“splitting solution” involving treating failures to punish as a separate crime.).
90
Weigend, supra note 89, at 1021.
91
Id. at 1021.
92
Id.; See opinion to similar effect supra note 83.
93
Weigend, supra note 89, at 1021.
94
Otto Triffterer, Causality, a Separate Element of the Doctrine of Superior
Responsibility as Expressed in Article 28 Rome Statute?, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L., 203
(2002) (arguing that causation is embedded in the structure of superior responsibility);
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 42-43 (1st ed. 2009)
(accepting that superior responsibility is a mode of liability, and rejecting the view that
the doctrine of superior responsibility contains no requirement of causality).
95
Triffterer, supra note 94, at 203. Use of the word “absolve” in the text is my own. I use
this in anticipation of a criticism that Triffterer’s “second chance” is causally
unnecessary if the failure to control is already adequate. With this modification, I believe
his account is coherent causally, even if I harbor grave doubts whether the causal element
could ever match the requisite subjective element of the subordinate’s crime at the time
of perpetration.
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this explanation unsatisfying,96 but its attempt to justify the mode of
liability view in causal terms surely highlights the significance causation
plays in any robust theory of blame attribution, at least for harm-type
offences.
Only one scholar begs to differ. In her excellent article, Amy
Sepinwall makes the strongest case for treating the failure to punish as a
mode of liability by pointing out how “failure to punish can be read as an
expression of his support for his troops’ act.”97 She argues that because
the superior intends the failure, he aligns himself with the subordinate’s
atrocity.98 In so doing, the commander compounds his subordinates’
offense, such that “he ought to be held criminally liable for it.”99 Although
I have some sympathy for this explanation,100 it unjustifiably snubs the
philosophical rationale that makes causation central to theories of criminal
responsibility everywhere. Without it, we abandon the project of creating
an objective connection between an accusers action and the harm to which
international criminal justice assigns moral weight in calculating
responsibility, leaving little principled protection against thought-crimes,
guilt by association, punishment based on status or other innovative
doctrine that allow policy to supersede desert.
Thus, if international criminal justice is to become coherent not harsh,
causation is an indispensable element for the perpetration of all harm-type
offences. There is, however, one final twist in this plot. For secondary
parties, the harm/conduct distinction disappears because the derivative
nature of the secondary party’s liability creates a cause-like
relationship.101 The war crime of declaring no quarter is a conduct-type
war crime (insofar as the consequences of the declaration are legally
immaterial), but assessing whether a superior can be convicted of the
crime for failing to punish a subordinate who made the announcement
demands causation too. How else can we justify convicting the superior of
96

Weigend, supra note 89, at 1021; Meloni, supra note 89, at 630.
Sepinwall, supra note 63, at 289.
98
Id. at 292.
99
Id. at 295.
100
Her argument is, for instance, a wonderful explanation of why failures to punish must
be criminalized in the face of fears of over-criminalization more broadly. See DOUGLAS
N. HUSAK, OVER CRIMINALIZATION (2008). Nonetheless, my own view is that a separate
conduct-based crime remains the appropriate form of liability, since the superior makes
no difference to a completed atrocity.
101
Sanford H Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985) (“the notion of derivativeness can be
expressed as well in terms of the requirement of a result: just as causation doctrine
requires that the prohibited result occur before there can be an issue of the actor having
caused it, so in complicity doctrine there must be a violation of law by the principal
before there can be an issue of the secondary party’s liability for it.”).
97
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this particular war crime, other than by showing that his actions made a
difference to someone else committing the offense? Thus, if the vast
majority of scholars in international criminal justice assume valid
foundations in their criticisms of superior responsibility, causality must be
an element of all “modes of liability” within the discipline.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL SHORTCOMINGS OF COMPLICITY
The previous section identified two benchmarks for testing the
theoretical merit of modes of liability that emerge from scholarship in
international criminal justice. First, there is a conceptual need for
congruence between the mental element in the crime and that required for
the mode of liability; and second, an accused’s acts must be causally
connected to the harm contemplated in the crime of which she is
ultimately convicted. Before we apply these same benchmarks to
complicity, we must first interrogate the nature of accessorial liability in
order to establish that a comparison across different modes of liability is
methodologically defensible.
A.

The Nature of Complicity – Two Defining Features
1.

Complicity as “Mode of Liability”

In his memorable treatise on accomplice liability, K.J.M Smith
eloquently forewarned that “[s]urveying complicity's hazy theoretical
landscape can, depending on the commentator's nerve, temperament, and
resilience, induce feelings running from hand-rubbing relish to hand-onthe-brow gloom.”102 My analysis sails much closer to the gloom than the
relish, for there is much in the peripheries of complicity that is deeply
unsatisfying. The question remains, however, to what extent complicity
can be compared to other modes of liability, and if it is abandoned in favor
of a unitary theory of perpetration, what features of complicity will a
unitary theory have to accommodate? The first prerequisite is that
complicity must act as a mode of liability too.
In domestic law, it traditionally does precisely this. In the AngloAmerican tradition, for example, “the accomplice is guilty of the same

102

K. J. M. SMITH, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 4
(1991).
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offense as the principle.”103 The driver of the getaway car, in other words,
is convicted of the same offense as her confederates who hold up the bank
at gunpoint, even though the getaway driver does not personally steal a
thing. Civil law countries follow this approach too, although the similarity
is sometime overlooked in disparate approaches to sentencing. In
Germany, for instance, aiders and abettors are sentenced to a maximum of
three quarters of the penalty for the offense they facilitate whereas the
sentence for instigators is taken from the same sentence range as
principals.104 If one wonders how the great diversity of complicitous acts
could consistently square with such neat mathematical divisions,105 the
rule’s apparent rigidity should not cloud our vision of complicity’s
overarching structure—regardless of how the accomplice’s sentence is to
be calculated, these systems unequivocally hold the accessory liable for
the rape, theft or murder that she assists in bringing to fruition.
Some national jurisdictions take the equivalence between
perpetration and complicity one step further. In France and England,
criminal legislation explicitly stipulates that the accomplice “shall be
liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender.”106 In
other words, not only is the label “robbery” common to the sanction
visited on the robber and her getaway driver, both offenders warrant
potentially equivalent punishment. In light of these principles, one shares
George Fletcher’s bewilderment “why the French and Anglo-American
systems ever recognized distinctions among perpetrators, joint
perpetrators and accomplices.”107 I return to this question in due course,
but for now it is sufficient to observe that domestic jurisdictions have
traditionally (but not invariably) viewed complicity of a mode of liability
103

Sullivan, supra note 15, at 154; Fletcher, supra note 34, at 649-650 (“Aiding another
person to commit a crime renders one an accomplice, and being an accomplice is simply
one way of ‘being guilty of an offence.’”).
104
Strafgesetzbuch, § 26, 27 and 49. For a modern English translation, see MICHAEL
BOHLANDER, THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 43, 50
(2008).
105
Is it not possible that some rogue aider is five sixths as culpable as the perpetrator?
As Michael Moore has argued, “[o]ne could say that, on average, accomplices are lesssubstantial causers than are the principals they aid, and this is true enough. Yet this is
only a rule of thumb, something that is true in the general run of causes.” Moore, supra
note 17, at 423; And in fact, the intuition that the indirect nature of the accomplice’s acts
render her less culpable is “surprisingly difficult to justify”. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ,
COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 147 (2000) (discussing whether
complicit actors are less culpable than direct actors). For further discussion, see Fletcher,
supra note 34, at 654-657 (addressing the rationale for categorically mitigating the
accessory’s punishment.).
106
The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c.98), s. 8 (emphasis added).
107
Fletcher, supra note 33, at 651.
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through which one becomes responsible for the perpetrator’s crime
regardless of sentencing policy.
This history has notable modern exceptions. Contrary to earlier
understandings that there is no crime of “being an accessory”,108 some
domestic jurisdictions have since passed an inchoate offense called
criminal facilitation.109 These new inchoate offenses, which generally coexist alongside orthodox notions of complicity, are inspired by the view
that accessorial liability need not function as a mode of liability.110 Once
again, moral luck provides one important rationale for the modern
inchoate variations of complicity—why should the accomplice who sends
a crowbar to assist a prison breakout be acquitted of the offence only
because the inmate fortuitously manages to escape without it? In terms of
desert, this is undoubtedly perplexing—“[w]hether the aid is actually
rendered is fortuitous; the actor is equally culpable and his dangerousness
is equally great if the perpetrator never receives the aid.”111 In addition,
some doubt that an accomplice can ever cause a perpetrator with capacity
for autonomous choice to commit a crime,112 offering a further basis for
adding an inchoate version of complicity that excludes causal inquiries
outright.
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Id. at 582 (“the actor is punished for a violation of the same prohibitory norm that
covers standard cases of perpetration. There is no crime of … 'being an accessory’”.).
109
In England and Wales, sections 44, 45 and 46 of the Serious Crimes 2007 create three
new inchoate crimes of intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence; Encouraging or
Assisting an Offence believing it will be committed; and encouraging or assisting
offences believing one or more will be committed. For commentary, see ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 458–461 (6 ed. 2009). In the United States,
similar offenses are labeled criminal facilitation. For discussion, see Robert Weisberg,
Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 261-270 (2000).
110
Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 239, 301 (2007) (arguing
that causality should play no role in complicity, in part, in order to limit the role of moral
luck in criminal law). For similar sorts of arguments, see Richard Buxton, Complicity
and the Law Commission, CRIM. L. REV. 223 (1973) (“the way out of these and other
difficulties would be to create a general offence of aiding or encouraging crime,
committed by one who does acts which are known to be likely to be of assistance or
encouragement to another in committing crime, whether or not that principal crime is in
fact committed.”); Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, 15
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 25 (1996) (“harm principles should have little or nothing to do with
the law of complicity.”); Michael Moore summarizes these arguments succinctly by
claiming that “(on this view) accomplice liability is just inchoate liability in the special
cases when the evil sought to be prevented by the law has occurred (even though the
accomplice did not cause it to occur).” Moore, supra note 13, at 401. Note, however, that
several of these authors would eliminate this special requirement that the harm occurred,
making complicity resemble attempt even more closely than Moore suggests.
111
Fletcher, supra note 26, at 679.
112
Yeager, supra note 110, at 31.
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Where does complicity in international criminal justice stand on
these competing visions of accessorial liability? As one might expect, it
unquestioningly rejects the modern avant-garde in favor of tradition.
Without doubt, international courts do not treat complicity as a separate
inchoate offense. A range of international courts, both historical and
contemporary, have convicted accessories of the same offense as the
perpetrator and done so while openly referring to aiding and abetting as a
“mode of liability.”113 As further and decisive evidence of this reality, the
terms aiding and abetting, instigating, or any other of complicity’s
numerous synonyms never feature in the dispositions of international
criminal judgments in the overwhelming majority of instances.114 In
expressing condemnation of an accessory’s conduct, international courts
merely report that the defendant is responsible for crime X; we are not
told why.115
Indeed, there is much to commend this orthodox view of
complicity. Under an inchoate version, the vendors of the chemical
Zyklon B used as an asphyxiant in Auschwitz would be convicted of
criminal facilitation—not murder, extermination or genocide.116 This
alternative may overcome evidential difficulties proving complicity, but it
also gravely undervalues culpability to convict the vendors of the
chemical used to gas in excess of four million people of criminal
facilitation. Whatever one might think about the merit of creating a new
inchoate version of complicity to complement the more traditional
equivalent, when the crime (here genocide) does take place and the
accomplice’s actions make an unequivocal contribution to the criminal
113

Fletcher, supra note 26, at 637 (defining accessorial liability as "“all those who are
held derivately liable for another’s committing the offense.”).
114
The typical international trial alleging complicity concludes abruptly by declaring:
“The Accused RADOSLAV BRDANIN is found not guilty under Article 7(3) of the
Statute but GUILTY pursuant to Article 7(1) of the following counts: Count 3 –
Persecutions...” Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 1152 (Sep. 1,
2004); A comprehensive review of all convictions for aiding and abetting, instigation,
planning and ordering reveals that international courts and tribunals follow this format in
fifty-nine (59) other situations i.e. making no mention of the mode of liability within the
disposition of the judgment. In only three (3) scenarios, international courts state
something like: “The Chamber finds the Accused Haradin Bala GUILTY, pursuant to
Article 7(1) of the Statute, of the following counts: Count 4 - Torture, a violation of the
laws or customs of war, under Article 3 of the Statue, for having aided the torture of
L12.” Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Nov. 30, 2005).
Thus in over 95% of cases, international court’s dispositions make no mention of
complicity, even though it was the basis for conviction.
115
Id.
116
See UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two
Others “The Zyklon B Case”, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93.
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harm (here providing the means),117 convicting the accomplice of an
inchoate offense is at best like convicting an actual murderer of attempted
murder.118 If harm matters, mere facilitation is inadequate.
So, for better or worst, international criminal justice understands
complicity in traditionalist form. In fact, such is the comfort with the
unquestioning international dependence on pre-established traditional
notions of complicity that there are few arguments that the doctrine might
take inchoate form in international criminal justice. So somewhat
strangely, the highly charged judicial and academic debate over whether
failures to punish in superior responsibility should constitute a separate
inchoate offense finds no parallel in the international law governing
complicity, even though the issues are broadly analogous. The essential
consequence of all this is therefore that causation must be an element of
accomplice liability in order to honor the philosophical commitments
international criminal law has inherited from below.
2.

The Derivative Nature of Accessorial Liability

One further feature of complicity requires introduction as
background too. The second defining feature of accessorial liability both
internationally and domestically is that it is commonly known as a form of
“derivative liability.”119 Even the most nefarious accessory, who does
everything in her power to facilitate someone else’s crime, is not complicit
in anything if a perpetrator does not act wrongfully. If X sends a crowbar
to her friend Y in prison in order for Y to use it to break out of prison,
there is no crime if, unbeknownst to X, Y has independently broken out a
week before the crowbar arrives at its destination. True, this again raises
the perennial problem of moral luck (why should X benefit from Y’s
fortuitous earlier breakout), but the long history of complicity has almost
117

Assume for the sake of this argument that Bruno Tesch’s company Tesch & Stabenow
was the only available supplier of the means of exterminating such a large number of
civilians, such that their contribution was an indispensible cause of the crime. In fact, as I
detail below, this is not factually accurate, but my minor factual modification makes the
normative point indisputable.
118
Actually, convicting those who intentionally provide chemicals for a genocide that
subsequently takes place is even more objectionable than convicting an actual murder of
attempted murder, because the label attempted murder at least communicates the gravity
of the offense involved. Criminal facilitation communicates nothing of the sort, and to
the extent that the label of the crime is a key element in the punishment inflicted on an
accused, this significantly under-represents desert.
119
Fletcher, supra note 26, at 637 (defining accessorial liability as "all those who are held
derivately liable for another’s committing the offense.”).
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invariably defined complicity as contingent upon the wrongdoing of a
perpetrator.
Historically, this dependence was so intense that the accomplice
would escape prosecution if the principal perpetrator was never
apprehended, prosecuted and convicted.120 For instance, until the
eighteenth century no accessory could be convicted if his principal had
died, received pardon by clergy, or had not been convicted for any reason
at all.121 In England it was only in 1848 that it became possible to indict,
try, convict and punish an accessory before the fact “in all respects as if he
were a principal felon”,122 regardless of whether the perpetrator was first
brought to trial and convicted. Around the same time, Continental systems
made a similar shift, which reduced the principal’s perpetration of the
crime to a contested issue within the accessory’s trial. While these
changes meant that the formal reliance on derivative liability within
complicity was less strict, it remained a central feature of the doctrine.
The derivative nature of accomplice liability was later further
diluted but again leaving the basic concept intact. In most national
jurisdictions, an accomplice can now be held responsible where the
principal perpetrator’s crime is excused, say when an accomplice assists
someone insane to commit a crime. As a result, complicity is now viewed
as entailing only a “limited or partially derivative character.”123 Although
the moral basis for this dilution is obvious, it also gives rise to
downstream complications. How do we determine the responsibility of
someone who gives you a gun intending that you kill Mr. W, but
fortuitously, Mr. W attacks you first and you kill him with the gun in selfdefense?124 While cases of this sort involving culpable intentions on the
accomplice’s part but justified actions on the perpetrator’s are complex,
the complexity does not eclipse the overraching principle—the vast

120

Dubber, supra note 7, at 982 (showing how a putative accomplice would “[e]scape
trial and punishment if the principal was never found, was never prosecuted, was
acquitted, was convicted but had his conviction overturned or was pardoned.”) .
121
Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 689, 695 (1929); Smith, supra note 102, at 20-23.
122
Sayre, supra note 121, at 695.
123
Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, Problems of Justification and Excuse in the Setting of
Accessorial Conduct, 1986 BYU L. REV. 611, 620 (highlighting how the notion of
limitierte Akzessorietat was not developed in German criminal law until 1943).
124
For even more complicated variants of my example, see Fletcher, supra note 27, at
667-669 (discussing inconsistent American case law on the issue of whether a
confederate of a criminal who is justifiably shot by police while fleeing the crime-scene
can be an accomplice in the death of his confederate.); Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, supra
note 123, at 629-630 (discussing a scenario where the “accomplice” deliberately initiates
a situation where you kill Mr. W in self defense.).
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majority of domestic criminal systems still maintain that the accessory’s
liability is contingent on the principle perpetrator’s wrongdoing.
Once again, international criminal courts follow domestic
influence, here explicitly. In a leading case on point, the ICTR embraced
the derivative nature of complicity by again relying on domestic
examples, this time in the form of the French criminal law. As a reflection
of a trend that international criminal tribunals repeat consistently, the
tribunal acknowledged that this notion implies that “[t]he accomplice has
not committed an autonomous crime, but has merely facilitated the
criminal enterprise committed by another.”125 In particular, it declared that
“complicity is borrowed criminality (criminalité d'emprunt).”126 In
drawing on this notion of criminalité d'emprunt, the Tribunal did not
register that the label is a relic of 18th century criminal reform, and that
leading French academics in the modern era view it as “[u]ne expression
vicieuse”.127 Although the matter has no substantive importance for
present purposes, the process of absorption marks an important theme—by
borrowing domestic doctrine (not leading theory), international courts
incorporate the historical idiosyncrasies of national criminal systems
regardless of their compliance with foundational principles.
But is there a danger that complicity borrows too much? In
addressing this problem, scholars in domestic criminal theory are earnest
to ward off allegations that derivative liability amounts to vicarious
liability. The former is justifiable, the latter anathema to liberal notions of
criminal justice. Sandy Kadish, for example, pleads that we (like
Eichmann) should not misconstrue the two terms—vicarious liability is
nothing more than punishment based on a relationship between the parties,
whereas derivative liability requires action and blameworthy choice on the
part of the secondary party, “mak[ing] it appropriate to blame him for
what the primary actor does.”128 But Kadish’s bright-line distinction begs
the more nuanced question. How distant are vicarious and derivative
liability really? In other words, what type of action and choice will suffice
to blame the accomplice for “what the primary actor does,” especially
when the accessory’s act and choice is not stipulated in the offense with
which she will ultimately be convicted? With an understanding of
complicity’s conceptual identity in international criminal justice, we now
turn to this dilemma.
125

Id. at 528.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 528 (Sep. 2, 1998)
127
Robert, supra note 8, at 351; See also Philippe Salvage, Le lien de causalité en
matière de complicité, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 25,
41 (1981).
128
Kadish, supra note 101, at 337.
126
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The Mental Element for Complicity

The mental element for accessorial liability is highly debated and
inconsistently applied at both international and domestic levels. Most
international criminal tribunals formally insist that “the requisite mental
element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor
assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal”,129 and justify
the adoption of this standard as the embodiment of customary
international law. Conversely, the Statute of the International Criminal
Court demands that the accessory assist the perpetrator “[f]or the purpose
of facilitating the commission of such a crime”.130 The intensity of
volition then, formally distinguishes complicity within competing
international incarnations of the doctrine. And yet, this formalism
conceals the reality that neither of these standards is that actually applied
most often in practice, and more importantly, that no single static standard
is theoretically defensible.
To begin, note the competing rationale for the purpose and
knowledge standards. The purpose standard is said to promote autonomy
by precluding criminal impediments to otherwise lawful activities that
depend on social interaction, especially business. The knowledge
standard, on the other hand, promotes social control and the prevention of
crime by demanding that agents take interventionist action when aware
that their actions are enabling offending.131 In its most ambitious guise,
the knowledge standard posits that the potential aider “might be an
educative or moralizing force that causes the would-be offender to change
his mind.”132 Given the magnitude of international crimes, the knowledge
standard would seem the more reasonable rationale for our purposes, and
yet both accounts miss the mark.
At the level of doctrine, the famed purpose/knowledge dichotomy
glosses over a complex literature arguing that the accomplice liability
actually involves “two dimensional fault”,133 which goes to the assistance
provided, the perpetrator’s intentions, and/or the ultimate crime
129

Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, supra note 22, at 102; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL
04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 145 (Aug. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 501 (Dec 13, 2004).
130
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 25 (3)(c), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
July 17, 1998.
131
Louis Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in American
Criminal Law - Knowledge or Intent, 51 MISS. L.J. 155, 178 (1980).
132
Id.
133
Ashworth, supra note 109, at 415; This also reflects the state of the law in German
criminal law, see Bohlander, supra note 2, at 168 (discussing “doppelter Anstifter- und
Gehilfenvorsatz" twofold intent of the aider or abettor).
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facilitated.134 Later, I argue that it possible to transcend these intermediary
steps by inquiring whether the accomplice satisfies the mental element of
the crime itself. For present purposes though, it suffices to recognize that
in international criminal justice, these types of technicalities are
completely overshadowed by the intensity of the contest between the
knowledge and purpose strands. Thus, when the US Supreme Court was
asked to hear allegations that a company was complicit in crimes
perpetrated within Apartheid South Africa, it faced a veritable deluge of
argument for either side of the purpose/knowledge divide.135
The dichotomy, like many other international modes of liability, is
inherited from international criminal law’s domestic forbearers. The
International Criminal Court’s reliance on purpose was (perhaps
unfaithfully) drawn from a similar standard in the American Law
Institute’s Model Penal Code, which appears to require that an accomplice
provide assistance with the purpose of facilitating the crime.136 In contrast,
other international criminal courts have drawn inspiration from the vast
array of national systems and earlier international precedents, which
merely require that an accomplice provide assistance to the perpetrator
knowing that her actions facilitate the crime. Therefore, to the extent that
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Smith, supra note 87, at 141-197 (reviewing English and American jurisprudence
requiring that the accessory must intend his acts of assistance or encouragement and be
aware of their ability to assist or encourage the principal offender, then exploring the
complexities of these two variations); GLANVILLE LLEWELYN WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW: THE GENERAL PART 394-396 (1953) (reviewing the multiple mental elements
required for the accomplice); Eser, supra note 70 at 923-924 (discussing the “double
intent” in complicity derived from German criminal law).
135
For comprehensive analyses, see Keitner, supra note 7, at 86-96; Doug Cassel,
Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6
NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 308-315 (2007).
136
I say perhaps unfaithfully because the Model Penal Code also has a strange provision
requiring that “[w]hen causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that
offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is
sufficient for the commission of the offense.” See Model Penal Code Commentaries
(Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), § 2.06, 296. The significance of this
provision is opaque. See Grace E Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2169, 2178 (1987) (pointing out that there is some ambiguitiy arising from
this provision about how to address the accomplice’s knowledge of circumstances. but
arguing that the accomplice should be required to show the same mental element as that
required for perpetration); In any event, even US Federal standards of complicity have
varied wildly, involving knowledge, purpose, recklessness and a unitary theory. See
Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor
and the Causer under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1486 (2001) (reviewing
the relevant caselaw and advocating for the unitary theory, which he describes as a
“derivative approach”).
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complicity is a doctrine deeply divided in international criminal justice,
the schism mirrors an identical disharmony between domestic traditions.
Remarkably, both sides of the dichotomy are misguided. As a
matter of pure doctrine, recklessness is the mental element for complicity
most frequently applied by international criminal courts. This is evident,
for instance, from the habitual inclusion within most international criminal
judgments, of the refrain that “[i]f he is aware that one of a number of
crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact
committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and
is guilty as an aider and an abettor.”137 Clearly, awareness of a probability
is constitutive of culpable risk-taking, not knowledge. It goes without
saying that the two concepts are far from synonymous. To paraphrase
Glanville Williams, becoming an accessory by providing assistance
“knowing that a crime is afoot” is quite different from helping “knowing
that a crime may be afoot.”138 Could it be that the purpose/knowledge
debate has ignored the true application of complicity in international
criminal justice?
Apparently so. To cite but one representative illustration,139 one
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial
Chamber first reiterated the widely cited proposition that complicity
merely requires awareness that “one of a number of crimes would
137

Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 246 (Dec. 10, 1998)
(emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 88, at 50; Prosecutor v. Kvocka,
Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 255 (Nov. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Naletilić &
Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 63 (March 31, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 350 (Jan. 31, 2005); Other cases refer to
accessorial liability for “foreseeable consequences” of one’s actions. See Prosecutor v.
Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, supra note 138, at 262 (“The aider or abettor
of persecution will . . . be held responsible for discriminatory acts committed by others
that were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their assistance or encouragement.”);
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 692 (May 7, 1997) (stating that the
aider and abettor “will . . . be responsible for all that naturally results from the
commission of the act in question.”).
138
Glanville Williams, Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code - 2, CRIM. L. REV. 98, 99
(1990).
139
For a small selection of further examples, see Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No.
IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 759 (Feb. 22, 2001) (convicting the accused
Kovac for handing over and/or selling two women to other soldiers whom he knew
would “most likely continue to rape and abuse them.”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No.
IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 602 (July 31, 2003) (convicting the accused Stakic for
deliberately placing civilians in harms way “with the knowledge that, in all likelihood,
the victims would come to grave harm and even death.”); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No.
SCSL 04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 1786 (June 20, 2007) (convicting the accused Brima for
killings because “was aware of the substantial likelihood that his presence would assist
the commission of the crime by the perpetrators.”) .
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probably be committed” ,140 then proceeded to convict a politician named
Radoslav Brđanin of the war crime of willful killing for issuing a decree
that required the victims to disarm. The key mental element linking
Brđanin to the willful killing (of victims and by perpetrators he did not
know in anything except broad abstractions) was that he was aware that
the disarmament decree “could only be implemented by use of force and
fear”. 141 But force and fear do not inevitably mean killing. Could his plan
not be executed through beatings, torture, forced expulsion and
intimidation instead? The only analytically plausible explanation is that
the killings were probable but not certain. This, as we suspected, is
recklessness.
So international criminal justice here tolerates a type of doublespeak, claiming knowledge but applying recklessness. This disparity
between theory and reality is surely alarming, but we should not lose sight
of its origins. As we have seen, a range of theories hypothesize that these
types of disparities between rhetoric and practice arise from importing
interpretative styles typical of human rights and law of war into
international criminal law; the effect of moral outrage on interpretative
technique; or the broader political aspirations associated with transitional
justice that are said to drive hermeneutics in international criminal
adjudication.142 And yet here, the double-speak has a quite different
genesis. Domestic criminal law in a range of countries that officially adopt
the knowledge standard not only allows a strikingly similar application of
the rule143; some of their leading academics openly lament that this
“introduces reckless knowledge as sufficient.”144 The origins, therefore,
are entirely domestic.
Things only get worse on the conceptual level. On closer
inspection, none of the three highly debated standards (purpose,
140

Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 114, at 272.
Id. at 473.
142
See supra note 11.
143
LaFave, supra note 2, at 725-727 (discussing the “natural and probable consequence”
rule in various American jurisdictions, which is very similar to that adopted in
international criminal justice); JACQUES-HENRI ROBERT, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 350 (6e
éd. refondue. ed. 2005) (setting out how an accomplice’s acts are unlawful if the crime
actually committed injures the same legal interest as that the accomplice considered);
Bohlander, supra note 2, at 167-173 (indicating that in German law, dolus eventualis will
suffice for the accomplice’s intent); Ashworth, supra note 110, at 415-420 (discussing
English jurisprudence that makes it adequate that the accomplice knows of the “type” of
crime the perpetrator will commit).
144
Ashworth, supra note 109, at 419 (cogently pointing out that “the accomplice knows
that one or more of a group of offences is virtually certain to be committed, which means
that in relation to the one(s) actually committed, there was knowledge only of a risk that
it would be committed - and that amounts to recklessness.”).
141
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knowledge, recklessness) is theoretically justifiable. Like other modes of
liability in international criminal justice, all three violate the principle of
culpability in certain circumstances because they all tolerate the
imposition of a crime’s stigma in situations where the person convicted of
the offense did not make the blameworthy choice necessary to be found
guilty of that particular offense. Many point out the perversity of using
JCE III to escalate blame for genocide in this manner, but what about
instances where complicity has an identical effect?145 With accessorial
liability, individuals are also held responsible for genocide where they
knew or were merely aware that genocide was one of a number of crimes
that would “probably be committed.”146 These scenarios, which are
actually more common in practice, violate culpability too. Tellingly, these
violations are explicitly based on examples drawn from a host of western
systems.147
Why then are all these standards conceptually problematic? Let us
consider the reckless standard of complicity first. On a positive note,
recklessness is at least very candid about its function—it avoids
complicity being rendered “a dead letter”.148 The argument hinges on the
145

Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Cases Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and
ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 497 (Dec. 13, 2004) (“…this standard (knowledge) does not
extinguish the specific intent requirement of genocide. To convict an accused of aiding
and abetting genocide based on the “knowledge” standard, the Prosecution must prove
that those who physically carried out crimes acted with the specific intent to commit
genocide.”).
146
The most famous use of complicity to escalate responsibility occurred in the Krstić
case, were the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY overturned the Trial Chamber’s conviction
of General Krstić as a principal perpetrator in genocide, substituting a conviction for the
same crime through complicity. This was necessary, according to the Appeals Chamber,
because “[t]here was a demonstrable failure by the Trial Chamber to supply adequate
proof that Radislav Krstić possessed the genocidal intent.” Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No.
IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 134 (Apr. 19, 2004). There are, however, many more cases that
adopt the same position. For a small subset of such cases across various international
criminal tribunals, see Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 84, at 52 (finding that for the
crime against humanity of persecution that “the aider and abettor in persecution, an
offense with a specific intent, must be aware... of the discriminatory intent of the
perpetrators of that crime,” but “need not share the intent”). Prosecutor v. Fofana, supra
note 129, at 145 (“In the case of specific intent offences, the aider and abettor must have
knowledge that the principal offender possessed the specific intent required.”);
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment, ¶ 2009 (Dec. 18, 2008)
(“[i]n cases of specific intent crimes such as persecution or genocide, the aider and
abetter must know of the principal perpetrator’s specific intent.”).
147
See the discussion of French, German, Swiss, English, Canadian and Australian law
within the Krstić Appeal Judgment, which ultimately carried the day in what would
rapidly become the accepted position across all international criminal tribunals.
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 134 (Apr. 19, 2004).
148
BRENT FISSE & COLIN HOWARD, HOWARD’S CRIMINAL LAW 332 (5th ed. 1990).
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inability to know the future with certainty. Even if member X of a
criminal gang provides her terrorist colleague Y with a nuclear warhead
for a specific terrorist mission, X cannot know with certainty that a crime
will transpire.149 Short of knowing that water will flow downhill or that
the sun will rise in the East, no one can know with certainty what the
future will involve, and surely few human actions ever acquire a degree of
predictability anywhere close to the direction of the Earth’s rotation or
laws of physics.150 Thus, argue the recklessness advocates, we either deny
that complicity exists for assistance in advance of the crime (because
people can seldom know what others will do in the future) or we apply a
standard closer to recklessness for accomplices who choose to undertake
acts they know are inherently risky.151
The competing criticisms of recklessness are, however, equally
compelling. For many, embracing reckless complicity would require us to
continuously vet those with whom we have dealings so that we can ensure
that our interactions do not lead to potentially wide-ranging criminal
harm. This, according to many scholars, would have the unsavory
consequence of creating “blank cheque responsibility”,152 where the aider
becomes responsible for all foreseeable consequences of their daily public
interactions, transforming the average citizen into an “unpaid auxiliary
policeman”.153 Beyond unduly infringing upon liberty and individual
autonomy, a reckless standard of complicity would offend liberal notions
of punishment and inhibit social intercourse.154 To return to Glanville
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Id.
Id. Stephen Shute sees an ability to predict natural phenomena like the sun rising in
the East as undermining the argument that "[i]n the strictest sense of the word one cannot
'know' that something will be the case in the future.” Stephen Shute, Knowledge and
Belief in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL
PART 171, 186-187 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester eds., 2002); I am doubtful whether
these examples do enough to account for Fisse’s point about knowledge. Natural
phenomena like the sun rising tomorrow are merely examples of future events we can
predict with the highest degree of certainty, but these illustrations do not mean that
awareness of a probability is automatically equivalent to knowledge. To my mind, G.R.
Sullivan offers a more accurate explanation by accepting that we can know what the laws
of physics will produce in the future, but that many cases involving decisions about what
defendants knew of other people’s future acts “afford graphic demonstrations of how
statutory language is sometimes completely overridden.” G.R. Sullivan, Knowledge,
Belief, and Culpability, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART
207, 215 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester eds., 2002).
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Fisse and Howard, supra note 148, at 332.
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Smith, supra note 102, at 13.
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Williams, supra note 134, at 101.
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Kadish, supra note 101, at 353 (“A pall would be cast on ordinary activity if we had to
fear criminal liability for what others might do simply because our actions made their
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Williams, “[t]he law of complicity makes me my brother's keeper, but not
to the extent of requiring me to enquire whether he is engaging (or
proposing to engage) in iniquity, when my own conduct (apart from the
law of complicity) is innocent.” 155
But is this always the case? Notice how neither side of this debate
mentions desert, even though scholars of international criminal justice
rightly hold the concept dear. To conform with desert and its analog
culpability, recklessness should be appropriate as a standard of liability for
the accomplice when it is adequate for the perpetrator. After all, recall that
we earlier measured culpability by referencing elements of each particular
crime. The argument conveniently dovetails with claims that using
reckless as a standard for complicity where recklessness suffices for the
crime in question would not imperil an individual’s autonomy or chill
normal social interchange any more than reckless perpetration already
does.156 Consequently, there is no generic difficulty to reckless complicity
as such; it is really the application of recklessness across international
crimes whose mental elements vary that is unduly harsh. At present, this is
the dominant scenario in international criminal law.
The knowledge standard for complicity is just as objectionable,
albeit for slightly different reasons. As we have seen, a primary objection
to the knowledge standard is that it is an epistemological impossibility for
the vast majority of human actions,157 which probably explains why
international criminal jurisdictions follow the many national systems that
allow knowledge to surreptitiously dilute into recklessness. All the same,
acts more probable.”) As I set out in the next paragraph, Kadish does not himself agree
with this argument.
155
Williams, supra note 134, at 101. Apart from the responses to this line of argument I
set out below, I also find Glanville William’s argument that recklessness “requir[es] me
to enquire” misleading. One either assists someone believing that there is a substantial
probability that they will use your assistance to perpetrate a crime, or one declines to
offer that assistance. In either scenario, the duty to enquire does not enter in, and the
metaphor of unpaid auxiliary police is unsubstantiated. The position assimilates
complicity with omission liability perfectly, when there are important differences
between these two types of derivative liability. See Fletcher, supra note 34, at 676-677
(concluding a comparison between omission and complicity by highlighting the
differences between the two, many of which undermine William’s arguments).
156
Kadish, supra note 14, at 387 (“It is not evident to me that subjecting actors in these
circumstances to liability for a crime of recklessness need greatly imperil the security of
otherwise lawful activities, certainly not any more than holding actors liable for
recklessly ‘causing’ harms, which the law regularly does. People aren’t all that
unpredictable.”); Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of
Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 944-947 (2000) (defending reckless
complicity against arguments of overreach). For the traditional response to these
arguments, see Simester, supra note 46, at 588-560.
157
See supra note 142.
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the knowledge standard presents another special peculiarity—knowledge
of what? The dilemma is that the offense itself does not help answer the
question. After all, many international crimes make no mention of
knowledge whatsoever.158 So as soon as one utters the word knowledge, a
whole series of deeply complicated, highly debated and ultimately
inconsistent responses arise,159 born of “uncertainty as to whether the law
should be concerned with [the] mental state relating to [the accomplice’s]
own acts of assistance or encouragement, to his awareness of the
principal’s mental state, to the fault requirements for the substantive
offense involved, or some combination of the above.”160 Unfortunately, in
certain contexts, this uncertainty has permeated into international criminal
jurisdictions too.161
Complication, however, is not the knowledge standard’s worst
fault. The greater concern is that knowledge also violates culpability since,
in David and Goliath fashion, it too overpowers higher mental elements.
As previously mentioned, knowledge usually suffices for conviction of
international crimes requiring special intents,162 allowing the weaker
complicity standard to eviscerate the stronger character of the crime. Like
genocide, other international offenses from pillage to torture are said to
demand a specific purpose, for which knowledge should be perfectly
inadequate.163 For each of these crimes, the objective contribution to the

158

The offense need not mention knowledge at all. For a war crime like declaring no
quarter be given, the basic requirement is only that the perpetrator declared or ordered
that there shall be no survivors, and that the declaration or order “was given in order to
threaten an adversary or to conduct hostilities on the basis that there shall be no
survivors.” These elements make no mention of knowledge, leaving a great deal of
ambiguity about what the accomplice needs to know in order to be convicted of the
offense. This ambiguity also leads to terrible complexity. For example, see LAW
COMMISSION, PARTICIPATING IN CRIME, Law Com No. 305 (2007) (UK) (detailing the
tremendous complexity of the knowledge based system within England and Wales)
159
Weisberg, supra note 109, at 233 (exploring different interpretations of these three
elements); Grace E Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
2169, 2174 (1987), (arguing that, because of these multiple points of inquiry, confusion
has existed concerning the mens rea element of accomplice liability for years).
160
LaFave, supra note 2, at 324.
161
See the summary of inconsistent approaches, and the advent of the double intent in
Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶ 286-288 (June 30, 2006).
162
See above, note 128.
163
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, at 26 (pillage requires that the perpetrator
intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal
use,) I am compelled to add, I strongly disagree that this notion of private or personal use
is workable or reflects customary international law. See JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE
WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19-23 (2010).; id., at 14
(the war crime of torture requires the perpetrator to be aware of the factual circumstances
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crime must be carried out for a concrete purpose (to destroy, extract
information, or for personal or private use). Therefore, by merely
requiring knowledge as a necessary mental state for conviction, the test
harks back to the characteristics of other international modes of liability so
many scholars denounce as excess.
Perhaps purpose is the solution for complicity then? Alas, the
purpose standard only fares marginally better—it over-corrects then veers
from the path of culpability too. True, in many of the jurisdictions that
seemingly embrace purpose, the over-compensation is intentional. The
drafters of the US Model Penal Code, for instance, concluded that the
purpose standard was the preferable mental element for accessorial
liability in order to offset the indirect nature of the accomplice’s
contribution to the criminal harm.164 While this approach is often
celebrated as a laudable liberal adjustment to normal principles, we should
reflect momentarily on its implications—by this doctrine an accomplice
who acts in such a way that she not only satisfies the mental element of
the crime but makes an essential contribution to its realization is absolved
of liability. And yet, if we maintain principle, this too misapplies desert
and mis-communicates responsibility.
For one reason, an accessory who assists a crime with intent,
recklessness or negligence is not responsible, even though these mental
elements are by far and away the most prevalent within the criminal law.
Why is our faith in culpability so easily shaken here? If the mental
element set out in the criminal offence really does define the degree of
culpability associated with a crime (as many excellent critiques of other
modes of liability in international criminal justice assert), then should it
not also define the accomplice’s desert too?165 Otherwise, our method of
that established the protected status of the victim under the Geneva Conventions of
1949).
164
Evidently, the point was the subject of heated discussion. See Model Penal Code
Commentaries (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), § 2.06, 318-319 (noting
that while the Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code favored a standard broader than
purpose, the Institute rejected the position after tense debate). See also, Simester, supra
note 46, at 583 (arguing that the protection of potential victims and the preservation of
liberties for potential defendants “demand more stringent mens rea standards for
secondary liability than is needed to establish culpability.”).
165
I.H. Dennis, The Mental Element for Accessories, in CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JC SMITH, 60 (Peter Smith ed., 1987) (criticizing the purpose standard as
insensitive to retributive notions of desert); Sullivan, supra note 16, at 154-155 (arguing
that in order for the accomplice to be convicted of the same offense as the perpetrator,
retributive theory would require an equivalence of culpability.) For a competing
perspective, see Simester, supra note 46, at 600 (arguing that “culpability is not enough...
the better approach is to distinguish culpability from responsibility, and to focus on the
latter.”).
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identifying culpability is capable of manipulation based on arguments
from policy, in ways we earlier rejected. If we adopt a more sound
approach to culpability, then purpose is very frequently an unjustifiable
over-compensation that, in the final analysis, leads to potentially serious
under-punishment.
Coincidentally, a utilitarian concept of responsibility would
support the same conclusion. For a utilitarian view of punishment, purpose
is unattractive since deterrence (and therefore crime prevention) is
maximized by punishing those who are aware of even the slightest risk of
harm.166 Admittedly here, there are more complicated questions about
over-deterrence, which require a careful calibration of complicity
standards with the desire for free social intercourse, especially in the realm
of business.167 Nonetheless, utilitarian concerns tend to militate against
adoption of the highest conceivable notion of blameworthy moral choice
(i.e., purpose) across the entire panoply of international crimes, since
complicity can achieve greater deterrence for such tremendous harm by
setting the mental element at levels much closer to that defined in a crime.
If recklessness suffices for perpetration of an offense, demanding that the
accomplice assist the crime with the purpose of bringing it about underdeters accomplices.
Moreover, empirical research suggests that in many instances
members of the public believe that the accomplice is blameworthy even
though they did not share the perpetrator’s criminal purpose. The subjects
of one survey reported “stark disagreement” with the “elevation thesis”
(viz. the idea that the mental element in complicity should be elevated to
purpose, that is, beyond that required within the paradigm of the crime
itself).168 Instead, respondents assigned punishments to accomplices “who
are knowing or even only reckless with respect to the criminal outcome in
instances in which the elevation view would assign no liability.”169 We
166

If, to paraphrase Ian Dennis, more reckless facilitators are deterred, perhaps fewer
atrocities will transpire. Dennis, supra note 165, at 60.
167
R A Duff, “Can I help you?” Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist, 10
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1990); Glanville Williams, supra note 135, at 366–380; S Bronitt,
“Defending Giorgianni - Part Two: New Solutions for Old Problems in Complicity”
(1993) 17 CRIM U 305. For myself, I doubt whether business deserves the privileged
status it often receives in the theoretical discussions of this topic, given that it merely
represents one facet of social interaction where influence is rampant. What, for instance,
about families, literature, music and teachers?
168
PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN M DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 103 (1996).
169
Id. at 103. (concluding that “[f]rom the point of view of our respondents, the
culpability requirement as to result should not be elevated to purposeful... instead, the
offense should be graded according to the degree of culpability that the accomplice
shows.”).
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might doubt the extent to which these findings could be extrapolated
across an international community,170 but the research does at least serve
as further grounds for caution. Using purpose as the mental element for
complicity may badly fail to match popular notions of responsibility,
which would diminish international criminal justice’s prospects of
promoting reconciliation, transitional justice or other desired objectives.
From both retributive and utilitarian perspectives then, purpose fails.
Where does this leave us? If the preceding analysis is correct, all
static standards of complicity are indefensible. All fixed mental elements
for accessorial liability (i.e., purpose, knowledge or recklessness) violate
basic principles of blame attribution since in each, there will occasionally
be a marked departure from culpability when the elements of the crime do
not match those of the mode of liability. In these instances, complicity
distorts an accused’s degree of responsibility, either by amplifying
culpability relative to the elements of the crime with which she is held
responsible or artificially elevating culpability beyond its normal
parameters to absolve her otherwise blameworthy conduct. In these
situations, complicity will only conform with culpability out of chance
couplings between mental elements within complicity and those required
for crimes. Relative to desert, responsibility becomes arbitrary, replicating
the very characteristics so many scholars deride in other international
modes of liability.
The consequences are, needless to say, hard to overstate. First,
these departures from fundamental principles of blame attribution are not
nefarious creations of an illiberal international system; they are borrowed
from domestic criminal systems that set bad examples. While JCE and
superior responsibility’s origins in domestic law are more easily concealed
in only a portion of national jurisdictions, there can be little doubt that
domestic criminal systems from the vast majority of the world adopt
objectionable static mental elements for complicity. The oftentimes heated
170

Anthony Duff argues that there is a conceptual problem with punishing at the
supranational level, to the extent that “[c]alling someone to answer, holding someone
responsible, is a communicative endeavor which presupposes normative community;
normative community requires at least a modicum of mutuality” Anthony Duff, Can We
Punish the Perpetrators of Atrocities?, in THE RELIGIOUS IN RESPONSES TO MASS
ATROCITY 93 (Thomas Brudholm & Thomas Cushman eds., 2009). Although these
criticisms are important, they do tend to overlook the growing practice of national courts
prosecuting their own nationals for international crimes within domestic courts, and the
supranational principle of complementarity, which seeks to institutionalize that shift
towards trials in national communities. Moreover, the enforcement of international
criminal norms in regional international courts, which represent a more homogenous
community, may improve the case for international criminal adjudication. See for
instance, William W Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729 (2003).
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debate between proponents of these various standards has only obfuscated
the reality that none are theoretically defensible, and that the solution lies
in transcending rather than deepening terms of the current debate. In this
light, international criminal justice’s major sin is not that it has allowed
policy interests or interpretative styles from branches of international law
to crowd out criminal standards; but more that it has showed its domestic
antecedents too much reverence.
Thus, if international criminal justice is to acquire normative
coherence, it must disassociate itself from objectionable domestic
precedent. How would a defensible alternative look? Well, if the only
defensible conception of accomplice liability is one where the mental
element is the same as that required for perpetration, complicity ceases to
retain any independent identity over and above perpetration, at least at the
level of moral choice. And if complicity begins to dissolve into
perpetration in this way, should modes of liability as a species not
disappear along with it, for exactly the same reasons? In other words, if
any static conception of a mental element within a mode of liability
violates culpability relative to the mental elements in crimes (which vary
from one crime to the next), should we not abolish modes of liability
altogether in favor of a more capacious notion of perpetration? To a large
extent, the answer to this question depends upon how complicity fares
with respect to the second fundamental element of blame attribution. But,
as we will soon see, the answer is no more positive.
C.

The Physical Element of Complicity

We have established not only that complicity functions as a mode
of liability in international criminal justice, but that many international
crimes also require harm as a pre-condition for responsibility. Given these
characteristics, causation is conceptually necessary to bind accomplices to
proscribed criminality if there is any chance of placating the critics of
other international modes of liability, and more basically, of respecting the
principle of culpability. In other words, having attributed complicity an
ultra-orthodox status in international criminal law, we are left with a stark
and seemingly intractable choice between only two options: we either
accept that causation is an element of accessorial liability, in which case it
shares common features with perpetration; or we conclude that complicity
is acausal in structure, in which case it violates principles of culpability in
ways that scholars of international criminal justice rightly find
reprehensible.
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Surprisingly, international courts opt for the latter of these
appraoches. The accepted position before international courts and
tribunals is that “proof of a cause-effect relationship between the conduct
of the aider and abettor and the commission of the crime, or proof that
such conduct served as a condition precedent to the commission of the
crime, is not required.”171 Needless to say, this defies basic thinking in
criminal theory. By this reasoning, international courts define complicity
in such a way that it explicitly violates a principle international criminal
lawyers view as cardinal; a principle they often employ to passionately
censure the breadth of other modes of liability within the field; and a
principle that theorists call foundational.
Thankfully, some action relative to the criminal harm is required
of the accomplice in international criminal law. International courts and
tribunals invariably stipulate that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting is
that the support of the aider and abettor has a substantial effect upon the
perpetration of the crime.”172 But alas, this merely adds new layers of
ambiguity to already opaque waters. What could it possibly mean to have
a substantial effect upon the perpetration of a crime without causing it?173
The puzzle is how courts can simply do away with causation in favor of
this substantial effect standard, when by all accepted wisdom, “there is no

171

Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 88, at 48 (emphasis added); For a different rendering
of the same idea, see Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶
901 (July 20, 2009) (“There is no requirement of a causal relationship between the
conduct of the aider or abettor and the commission of the crime.”). The same standard
has spread to other international criminal tribunals. Prosecutor v. Fofana, supra note 129,
at 143 (same); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 33
(June 7, 2001) (“the assistance given by the accomplice need not constitute an
indispensable element, i.e. a conditio sine qua non, of the acts of the perpetrator.”).
172
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 88, at 48; Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Case
No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 187 (May 9, 2007) (“the Appeals Chamber reiterated that
one of the requirements for the actus reus of aiding and abetting is that the support of the
aider and abettor have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime”);
Ndindabahizi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Jan. 16,
2007) (a conviction for aiding and abetting presupposes that the support of the aider and
abetter has a substantial effect upon the perpetrated crime."); Prosecutor v. Brima, supra
note 32, at 775 (“The actus reus of ‘aiding and abetting’ requires that the accused gave
practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which had a substantial effect on
the perpetration of a crime.”).
173
The idea is reminiscent of a cartoon in the New Yorker magazine that depicts a
meeting between three businesspeople, where one comments to another “we want to
include you in this decision without letting you affect it.” See The Cartoon Bank, (2011)
http://www.cartoonbank.com/2011/we-want-to-include-you-in-this-decision-withoutletting-you-affect-it/invt/137184/
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way of contributing to any result, directly or indirectly, except
causally.”174
The origins of this substantial effect test are obscure in
international criminal law,175 but we can speculate. Perhaps the position
was tacitly influenced by English criminal theory, which has traditionally
harbored a marked distaste for the view that an accomplice could cause
the perpetrator’s crime. Following the seminal work of H.L.A. Hart and
Tony Honoré on causation, the large majority of commentators within the
English-speaking world have argued that the volitional actions required to
convict the direct perpetrator preclude the claim that the accomplice too
caused the harm.176 The perpetrator made a decision; this interrupts all
earlier causal influence, and acts as an intervening cause. On this account,
the accomplice’s actions are no more the cause of a crime than the
perpetrator’s genes, family history and socio-economic background, all of
which undoubtedly provide influence, without overriding the perpetrator’s
blameworthy moral choice.177 Could this reasoning possibly explain the
doctrinal ambiguity in the modern international criminal understanding of
the relationships between causation and complicity?
It seems doubtful. While Hart and Honoré’s work has proved
seminal, a competing line of authority has long recognized that in some
instances, the perpetrator’s actions join rather than break causal chains

174

Gardner, supra note 72, at 443.
The International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and
Security of Mankind adopted a definition of aiding and abetting that required the
accomplice to assist “directly and substantially”, but the only justification for this was
that this was “intended to limit the application of the Code to those individuals who had
had a significant role in the commission of a crime”. International Law Commission.
Summary of the 2437th Meeting, Consideration of the Draft Articles on Second Reading,
6 June 1996, para. 26. The two international judgments that initially endorsed the
substantial effect standard relied on the ILC recommendation, together with a selection of
WWII caselaw that made no direct mention of substantial effect. See Prosecutor v. Tadić,
supra note 128, at 688-692); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 137, at 219-231.
Accordingly, I conclude that the true criminological motivations for the substantial effect
doctrine are mainly unarticulated.
176
Hart and Honoré, supra note 71, at 41 (“A deliberate human act is therefore most
often a barrier and a goal in tracing back causes in such inquiries: it is something through
which we do not trace the cause of a later event and something to which we do trace the
cause through intervening causes of other kinds.”); Id., at 129 (“the free, deliberate and
informed act or omission of a human being, intended to produce the consequence which
is in fact produced, negatives causal connection.”).
177
Kadish, supra note 101, at 333 (arguing that otherwise, we do violence to notions of
agency and the conception of a human action as freely chosen upon which we depend to
convict the perpetrator).
175
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created by an accomplice.178 For example, if X pays a hit-man to
assassinate his wife, arranges for the wife to be at a specific location at a
time he discloses to the hit-man; provides the hit-man with the weapon
necessary for the crime and subsequently disposes of his wife’s dead
body, there is little trouble in declaring that X caused his wife’s death.179
Was X the actual perpetrator (in the sense of breaking the glass)?
Obviously not; the crime was committed by the hit-man. Nevertheless, we
are by no means precluded from simultaneously holding the hit-man
responsible for the killing, given that we have little difficulty saying that
both X and the hit-man caused the wife’s death.180 So if Hart and
Honoré’s vision of perpetrators always acting as intervening causes was
the inspiration for the international rule, the choice was poor.
Perhaps the motivation for abandoning causation in complicity
stemmed from a different concern, namely that the crimes would have

178

Moore, supra note 72, at Part IV, The Legal Presupposition of There Being
Intervening Causes (criticizing Hart and Honore’s views that voluntary actions are
intervening causes). Feinberg, supra note 23 (arguing, contrary to Hart and Honoré, that
“there is no conceptual barrier, at least none imposed by common sense, to our speaking
of the causes of voluntary actions.”); In particular, Feinberg’s conceptual distinction
between “causing a person to act” and “making him act” offers a strong critique of Hart
and Honoré’s thesis. Id. at 161, 165 (arguing that although a mother clearly played some
(albeit extremely remote) causal role in her 30-year old son’s crime by merely having
given birth to the perpetrator, it would be “misleading in the extreme” to suggest that his
mother thirty years earlier “made” him perpetrate the crime.) For further criticism of
Hart and Honoré’s thesis, see Smith, supra note 87, at 68-70 (“it is possible to construct
counter-examples where actions, while voluntary within the meaning accorded by Hart
and Honoré, are in ‘common speech’ reasonably describable as ‘caused’ by another.”)
For a similar position in German criminal theory, see GEORGE FREUND, in: Wolfgang
Joecks, Klaus Miebach and Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (ed.), MUNCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH BAND 1 1 §§ 1-51 StGB, 2003, Vor §§ 13 ff.,
marginal number 318; CLAUS ROXIN, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil Band I: Grundlagen,
Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 4th ed. 2006, § 11, marginal number 28, at p. 363.
179
Moore, supra note 17, at 422-423; Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM.
L. PHIL. 289, 294 (2007). In fairness to Hart and Honoré, they viewed instigation as an
exception to their general rule that voluntary action breaks causal chains, but as Joel
Feinberg retorts “they put forward no more general principle to explain why the
exceptions are exceptions.” Feinberg, supra note 29, at 153.
180
International criminal courts and tribunals confirm as much. For instance, in the media
case where representatives of the Radio television libre des mille collines (RTLM) were
convicting of inciting genocide, the Rwanda Tribunal held that “[t]he nature of media is
such that causation of killing and other acts of genocide will necessarily be effected by an
immediately proximate cause in addition to the communication itself. In the Chamber’s
view, this does not diminish the causation to be attributed to the media, or the criminal
accountability of those responsible for the communication.” Prosecutor v. Nahimana et
al., supra note 76, at 952.
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occurred whatever the accomplice did.181 In many instances, complicity is
over-determined insofar as the accomplice’s assistance was readily
substitutable for the assistance of someone waiting in the wings. To return
to the Zyklon B example, if the Nazis had access to a long line of willing
suppliers of chemical asphyxiants (or variants that had comparable
effects), then it would be difficult to argue that the suppliers of Zyklon B
really caused the unspeakable consequences their chemicals enabled. As
one of the defendants claimed, had he not agreed to supply the chemicals
to Auschwitz, “the S.S. would certainly have achieved their aims by other
means.”182 Which judge, who knew anything about the stunning efficiency
of the Nazi regime, could doubt the claim? So if causation means “but for”
causation then, even if this firm did not furnish the S.S. with the means of
exterminating humans, the horror of Auschwitz would still have unfolded
almost identically. Thus, these particular vendors of Zyklon B did not
really cause anything.
This position, however, presumes an ill-informed notion of
causation. In the vast literature on the topic, over-determination features as
a recurrent theme.183 Throughout this extensive treatment, overdetermined causes are consistently treated as a form of causal
contribution, not grounds for adopting a substantial effect test in lieu of
181

There is some support for this thesis. Both of the first cases to address complicity in
modern international criminal justice refer to the problem of over-determination within
the context of discussions of the substantial effect doctrine. See (Prosecutor v. Tadić,
supra note 128, at 688 (acknowledging that “in virtually every situation, the criminal act
most probably would have occurred in the same way had not someone acted in the role
that the accused in fact assumed”). Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 137, at 224
(discussing a WWII case the defendant claimed that his conduct in no way contributed to
the crimes because others would have taken his place). Nonetheless, this explanation is
not entirely convincing, since the same judgment also acknowledged that “the culpability
of an aider and abettor is not negated by the fact that his assistance could easily have
been obtained from another.” Id.
182
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 102; indeed, even if
the S.S. were bent on using Zyklon B for the purposes, there were many other sources.
Representatives of the firm I.G. Farben were also prosecuted for supplying large
quantities of Zyklon-B that “was actually used in the mass extermination of inmates of
concentration camps, including Auschwitz.” UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others “The I.G. Farben Trial,” 10
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 23-24 (1947).
183
For an elegant philosophical discussion of the problem, which draws on examples of
complicity, see Jonathan Glover, It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It, 49
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (1975) (discussing over-determination
with reference to a scientist producing chemical and biological weapons); Kutz, supra
note 105 (exploring the responsibility of pilots in the Dresden fireboming on the basis of
over-determined causes); JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 57 (2008) (discussing over-determined causality
in the context of complicity, although he does not use the term over-determination).
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basic principles.184 In line with this reasoning, a slew of commentators
from different legal traditions consider that sine qua non causation must
be assessed relative to events “as they took place”,185 in order to avoid
allowing defendants like these to wash their hands of responsibility. So,
by selling vast quantities of chemical gases to the S.S. for use in
Auschwitz, Dr. Tesch and his colleagues made an important causal
contribution to the mass killing as it actually transpired. After all,
ignoring how things actually transpired would mean that no one could
ever cause murder. Everyone eventually dies, so the serial killer merely
modifies the time, place and manner of an inevitability. Clearly, the
modifications matter.
In fact, if there is a deeper unspoken influence in this perplexing
international account of complicity, it may herald from an unlikely
domestic source. In a surprising parallel with international principles,
German courts apply what is described as a furtherance formula
(“Förderungsformel”), according to which, the aider and abettor need not
have caused but must have actually furthered (“tatsächlich gefördert”) the
perpetrator’s crime.186 And yet, the vast majority of German academics
strongly disagree with this approach on the predictable grounds that it
unjustifiably discards causation.187 In fact, they are only consoled by the
impression that the furtherance formula probably differs little in practice
from causality, especially when causation is calculated based on “the harm

184

Hart and Honoré, supra note 71, at 117-119 (discussing what they describe as
additional causes, and the need for assessing sine qua non based on events that occurred
“in this particular way”); Smith, supra note 102, at 84 (“the sine qua non condition is
concerned with an event’s exact occurrence, including time, place, extent and type of
harm, and so on.”); Tatjana Hörnle, Commentary to “Complicity and Causality,” 1 CRIM.
L. PHIL. 143, 144 (2006) (using the example of a firing squad to show how the
“subtraction method” of calculating causation leads to injustice, which might be
overcome by focusing on events “as they happened.”); For criticism that this approach
misuses the term causation, see Yeager, supra note 110, at 29 (arguing that this approach
“simultaneously uses a word [cause or causation] in a special or technical sense that need
not confirm to our ordinary use of the word, while still trading on what we normally
mean by it.”). Likewise, for further criticisms, see Moore, supra note 15, at 406-407.
185
Id.
186
RGSt 58, 113 (114-115) (Entscheidungssammlung des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen
Vol. 58, p. 113, at pp. 114-115“). See also, CLAUS ROXIN, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil
Band II : Besondere Erscheinungsformen der Straftat, 2003, § 26 marginal number 186,
at p. 194.
187
See, WOLFGANG JOECKS, in: Wolfgang Joecks, Klaus Miebach and Bernd von
Heintschel-Heinegg (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch. Band 1 §§ 1-51
StGB, 2003, § 27, marginal numbers 23-37; STEPHAN A. OSNABRÜGGE, Die Beihilfe
und ihr Erfolg. Zur objektiven Beziehung zwischen Hilfeleistung und Haupttat in § 27
StGB, 2002, at 159-160, 261; Roxin, supra note 178.
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in its concrete appearance.”188 The parallel is illuminating. Even if the
influence of this German position on the international rule is unavoidably
speculative, its incongruity with accepted theory should dampen our
assurance that unprincipled international rules necessarily reveal the
triumph of international agenda over the restraining force of the criminal
law—departures from principle are ubiquitous.
If all this is sound, we are still left with the challenge of rescuing
the international definition of complicity from the jaws of domestic
incoherence. To achieve this, the standard international position requires
inversion. If we remove the word “not” from the accepted judicial
reasoning,189 the legal position becomes that “proof of a cause-effect
relationship between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the
commission of the crime is required,” and having a substantial effect on a
crime (in the sense of making a causal contribution to events as they
transpired) is a form of causation. This quick (but admittedly major) fix
protects complicity against the criticisms other modes of liability have
correctly endured within the field by ensuring that causality plays a role in
allocating blame to the accomplice. But it still leaves one further matter
conspicuously unexplored: why must the accomplice’s effect be
substantial?
At first blush, this requirement is just as bizarre as the others. On
the prevailing account of causation, an action is either a cause of an event
or it is not—why the extra element? Again, the pull of mainstream
domestic notions of complicity probably explains the doctrinal position. In
both Anglo-American and Continental traditions, concepts of proximity or
normative attribution intervene to preclude responsibility, where the
causal contribution is trivial, remote or unusual.190 A member of the
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Joecks, supra note 188, at marginal number 27; Roxin, supra note 178.
To recall, the accepted position in international criminal justice is “proof of a causeeffect relationship between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the commission of
the crime, or proof that such conduct served as a condition precedent to the commission
of the crime, is not required.” See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
190
Fletcher, supra note 33, at 590 (“Because the causal link is limitless, some new
concept must be devised to eliminate far-flung effects from the range of liability.
Common lawyers speak about proximate cause”.); in German criminal theory, normative
attribution (“objektive Zurechnung”) is considered an additional element of any actus
reus, in order to restrict the broad effect of causality. CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER TEIL. GRUNDLAGEN, DER AUFBAU DER VERBRECHENSLEHRE 372 (2006);
HEINZ KORIATH, KAUSALITÄT UND OBJEKTIVE ZURECHNUNG 15 (1 ed. 2007) (discussing
the implications of normative attribution); MANFRED MAIWALD, KAUSALITÄT UND
STRAFRECHT. STUDIEN ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NATURWISSENSCHAFT UND JURISPRUDENZ
4-5, 9 (1980); for a helpful English language summary, see Krey, supra note 28, at 59101.
189
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public who opens the door of a bank to let in a robber; 191 a restaurateur
who serves a murderer dinner prior to a killing; or an onlooker who
encourages the beating of a man who subsequently dies in an accident on
the way to the hospital all make causal contributions to criminal harm, but
these contributions are deemed too remote to warrant criminal
punishment. The substantial effect doctrine precludes liability even though
the assistance in each of these scenarios unequivocally contributed to
crimes as they transpired.
Perhaps the incorporation of the substantial effect doctrine in
international criminal law reveals the positive side of domestic influence,
even if it is part and parcel of a dependence that sometimes has perverse
consequences. In some instances, international criminal justice imitates
bad domestic examples that transgress culpability; but othertimes,
domestic influences serve commendable liberal purposes. If normative
attribution does explain the need for a substantial effect it might fit into
the latter category, even if the process of absorption into the international
is not more conscious than that which produces international standards of
blame attribution scholars rightly reject. In either case though,
international political agenda and interpretative cultures from other
branches of international law appear to play only back seat roles to the
driving force of preconceptions derived from domestic criminal law.
In any event, once we return to the substance of complicity, our
analysis indicates that it a defensible notion of complicity incorporates
both causation and normative attribution (or its equivalent proximity). As
soon as we recognize this, we are immediately drawn back into Gardner’s
“splendid paradox”: if these elements are common to perpetrator and
accomplice alike, why are accomplices not simply a subset of
perpetrators?192 As Michael Moore asks, “[a]ll substantially cause the
harm, so why is one treated as an accomplice and the others treated as
principals?”193 To answer this, we must next investigate whether there is
anything that necessitates a distinction between perpetrators and
accomplices at the stage of attribution, and assuming a negative answer,
whether complicity (like modes of liability in international criminal justice
generally) occasions more departures from coherent philosophical
principles, doctrinal uncertainties and hours of costly intellectual labor
than it is worth.
191

I borrow the example from Joshua Dressler, although he uses it in a different context.
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 91, 133 (1985).
192
Gardner, supra note 9, at 231. Gardner views the paradox as more apparent than real
because causal relations come in stronger and weaker versions. Id.
193
Moore, supra note 39, at 423.
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IV. TOWARDS A UNITARY THEORY OF PERPETRATION FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Up until now, we have observed how causation and the moral
choice contained in the definition of the crime are necessary conditions for
allocating blame to the perpetrator and the accomplice. I now argue that
these criteria are also sufficient. Although I do not endorse any particular
incarnation of the unitary theory, the Austrian concept of perpetration
offers helpful introductory flavor: “a punishable act is not simply
committed by the person who is a direct author of it, but also by all other
persons who cause another to execute it or who contribute in any other
manner to its execution. Consequently, the distinction between
perpetrators, instigators and accomplices is only of interest in order to
permit the judge to individualize the sentence, he who plays a modest role
being punished less than essential actors.”194 In the discussion that
follows, I first inquire whether there is anything of a normative nature that
theoretically precludes this approach in the abstract, then offer a range of
pragmatic reasons why a similar approach for international crimes may be
preferable to the status quo.
A.

An Abstract Theoretical Defense

International criminal justice’s response to the Hitler-asaccomplice dilemma has played out in three overlapping phases. Initially,
superior responsibility emerged as the theoretical response, but its
popularity was quickly surpassed by the rise of joint criminal enterprise as
the new prosecutorial doctrine of choice. Even though both of these modes
of liability were drawn from Anglo-American criminal traditions then
incorporated into the corpus of international criminal law as “sui generis”
forms of responsibility in international law,195 they both over-extend basic
194

Article 12, Austrian Criminal Code, translated from the French version in Pradel,
supra note 15, at 133. It is interesting to note that according to § 15 sec. 2 of the
Austrian Penal Code, the attempt to facilitate an offense is not punishable. This reveals
that the Austrian system still requires a distinction between instigators and aiders and
cannot therefore be considered a pure unitary system. I am grateful to Thomas Weigend
for the point.
195
In my view, any time a court refers to a mode of attribution as “sui generis,” the latin
acts as a mask for the departure from basic principles. The phrase is thus a telltale sign
that the mode of liability cannot be philosophically justified. Prosecutor v. Halilović,
supra note 52, at 78 (“The Trial Chamber further notes that the nature of command
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principles of criminal responsibility. As this became increasingly
apparent, these initial solutions for the problem were denounced as
illiberal, sending decision-makers, practitioners and academics back to the
drawing boards. Once again, they would look for domestic examples, this
time drawing on the German doctrine used to separate perpetrators from
accomplices as the next borrowed domestic solution. Arguably, this was
another false step.
Early on in its existence, the International Criminal Court
embraced the German “control over the crime” doctrine as a basis for
differentiating perpetrators from accomplices.196 On this understanding,
Hitler was a perpetrator because he had hegemonic control over the
atrocities in concentration camps, leaving the camp guards, bureaucratic
administrators and vendors of Zyklon B as mere accomplices.
Domestically, this “control over the crime” theory was viewed as a major
advance on earlier objective and subjective notions of perpetration. The
first of these viewed a perpetrator as someone who actually swung the
machete, but this failed to account for the fact that a perpetrator could use
an innocent agent to carry out a crime on her behalf. The second
subjective theory focused uniquely on whether the actor takes the crime
“to be his own,” but this calculation cannot be easily established, and
allows a person who perpetrates the crime with their own hand to be
described as an accomplice.197
responsibility itself, as a sui generis form of liability, which is distinct from the modes of
individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1), does not require a causal link”);
Prosecutor v. Orić, supra note 152, at 293 (“the superior’s responsibility under 7(3) of
the Statute can indeed be called a responsibility sui generis.”).
196
The standard was initially adopted in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 341 (June 15, 2009);
See also Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 486 (Sep. 30, 2008) (finding that
the criminal responsibility of a person “must be determined under the control over the
crime approach to distinguishing between principals and accessories.”). The concept was
also employed at the ICTY by one German judge, but the use of the doctrine was rejected
on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, supra note 139, at 440; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case
No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 62 (Mar. 22, 2006) (finding that “[t]his mode of liability, as
defined and applied by the Trial Chamber, does not have support in customary
international law or in the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal, which is binding on the
Trial Chambers.”).
197
Fletcher, supra note 33, at 655 (pointing out that the subjective test was unworkable in
practice because a trier of fact could not easily determine the attitude of the suspect at the
time of the deed.); Schreiber, supra note 123, at 626 (detailing the criticism that the
person swinging the machete could consider herself an accomplice, and thereby benefit
from lower penalties afforded accessories). Ultimately, some consider that this could also
lead to a situation where differences of opinion among assailants mean that there are no
perpetrators of a crime at all. This would arise where all participants in a criminal offense
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This initial influence quickly led to a major invocation of German
doctrine, even when certain doctrines were highly disputed domestically.
The international experiment with “control over the crime” was soon
followed by the adoption of German theories of co-perpetration, hitherto
rejected in international criminal justice. Likewise, indirect perpetration
was spawned as a viable mechanism for accounting for the Hitler-asaccomplice dilemma, at least in certain circumstances where the
perpetrator’s will was overcome by that of a mastermind at
headquarters—in a command post, or behind a desk far from the
bloodletting. To cap off the unconditional embrace of German criminal
theory in international criminal practice, the ICC even adopted a more
controversial German notion of functional perpetration through a
bureaucracy,198 even though one leading German theorist feared that this
“may create more problems than it solves.”199
Could the same thing be said for modes of liability in toto? Aside
from the wider concern that these types of uncritical domestic transplants
replicate the failed methodologies of the first two solutions to the Hitleras-accessory dilemma, it also conceals major philosophical assumptions.
One is especially important. Is there is any necessary distinction between
perpetrators and accomplices? Perplexingly, the ICC treats the question as
axiomatic; as if it is beyond all dispute. For instance, the decision that first
adopts the doctrine into international criminal justice simply states that
“the definitional criterion of the concept of co-perpetration is linked to the
distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories to a crime
where a criminal offence is committed by a plurality of persons.”200 We
are told nothing more about why the distinguishing criterion is so
conceptually inevitable, perhaps revealing a blindspot in the enthusiasm
for law crafted in a particular domestic system.
believed that they left the decision whether to commit the crime to others. For a full
discussion, see Olásolo et al., supra note 17, at 30-33.
198
See the discussion of Organisationsherrschaft (control over an organization), in
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 179, at 498-518.
199
Thomas Weigend, Perpetration Through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of
a German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 105 (2011) (“Since criminal liability
for ordering or instigation is a sufficient basis for imposing severe sentences on
responsible figures in the background of the actual crimes, adopting the notion of
‘perpetration through an organization’ may create more problems than it solves.”).
200
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 326 (June 15, 2009) (emphasis added). I add emphasis to the
words the distinguishing criterion because the use of the singular, without further
discussion, evidences an unquestioning allegiance to established dogma. This is precisely
the parochial influence of the domestic that often influences international criminal
doctrine too.
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In reality, the division is far from conceptually inevitable. A
number of other jurisdictions happily dispense with it (and its attendant
technicalities) in favor of only the two elements used to dissect
international modes of liability like JCE and superior responsibility. What
matters on a unitary account of perpetration it that the assailant made a
substantial causal contribution to a prohibited harm while harboring the
mental element necessary to make him responsible for that crime. To be
clear, I do not consider that the unitary theory of perpetration is the only
defensible account of perpetration or that differentiated models are
inherently harsh. Quite the contrary, my ambition here is simply to point
out that a unitary theory is at least as conceptually coherent as its
counterpart.
To start, notice that the real question is not whether there is a
moral difference between perpetration and complicity, but if there is such
a difference, whether it must feature at the initial stage of determining
liability rather than later during the sentencing phase. There is no obvious
structural impediment to taking accessories’ generally relatively lesser
culpability into account at the sentencing phase along with other factors
that are important to culpability but extraneous to the label visited upon
the accused. If a defendant’s motive for the crime, co-operation during
trial, or history of recidivism are factors that appropriately reflect on the
sentence they deserve, what rationale exists for treating the defendant’s
“important criminal energy” differently?201 Certainly, it is difficult to see
why one would choose to maintain an overly complicated, ever-expanding
and occasionally harsh set of “modes of liability” in international criminal
justice, if a more streamlined system can also mitigate punishment as
necessary.
To a large extent, this approach answers those who view
perpetration and complicity as inherently distinct. For John Gardner, for
instance, there is something innately privileged about being a perpetrator
as compared with “mere” complicity,202 such that “the attempt to
201

I refer to “important criminal energy” because it is the classic justification for a
distinction between perpetrators and accomplices founding German criminal theory. The
argument is that extensive participation shows important criminal energy, and that
qualitatively significant contributions are more culpable. So in contrast to the principal
and instigator, whose contributions drive the wrongdoing, the aider’s contribution is of
minor relative significance. CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL. BD. 2:
BESONDERE ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER STRAFTAT 231 (1. A. ed. 2003); See also
WOLFGANG JOECKS, KLAUS MIEBACH & GÜNTHER M. SANDER, MÜNCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH. GESAMTWERK: MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
STRAFGESETZBUCH 3. §§ 185 - 262 STGB: BD. 3 (1 ed. 2003) § 27, marginal number 1.
202
John Gardner argues that the distinction between principals and accessories is
embedded in the structure of rational agency. There is, in his view, a moral split between
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eliminate complicity from the moral landscape, in favor of a more
capacious domain of principalship, fails.”203 The distinction between
principals and accessories, he argues, is embedded in the structure of
rational agency—there is a moral split between what one must do
simpliciter, and what one must do by way of contribution to what
someone else does. While I tend to doubt the veracity of that claim,204
observe how it does no work to maintain the segregated notion of
complicity he defends—if there is such a distinction, it could figure at
sentencing once the crime in question is coherently settled. Thus, the
metaphysical distinction may well exist, but it has no obvious relevance
for or against the unitary theory of perpetration.
Similarly, the derivative nature of complicity is also neutral as
between differentiated and unitary models of perpetration.205 George
Fletcher, for instance, insists that “[p]erpetrators or principals are those
who are directly liable for the violation of a norm; accessories are those
who are derivatively liable.”206 This is perfectly unobjectionable as far as
definitions of a differentiated system go, but the definition does not
purport to address (let alone justify) the partition of forms of attribution
into a differentiated model. Clearly, we cannot escape our earlier analysis
of derivative liability entirely—an individual’s responsibility for the glass
others broke will always be at least partially derivative of at least one
other person’s wrongdoing,207 but nothing impedes treating the
what one must do simpliciter, and what one must do by way of contribution to what
someone else does. See Gardner, supra note 19, at 141.
203
Gardner later acknowledges in response to critics that “the distinction between
principals and accomplices might perhaps be excised from the law (e.g. for rule of law
reasons), but… it cannot be excised from life.” Gardner, supra note 183, at 253. I am
tempted to read this as a concession that a unitary theory of perpetration is legally
justifiable provided moral distinctions are respected within the sentencing phase, but I no
doubt read more into the comment than he might accept.
204
I doubt this because the point seems entirely contingent on the construction of the
particular offence in question. If, for example, an offence is defined as “causing rape,”
then the criminal offence itself collapses the distinction between perpetrators and
accomplices. Thus, if there is a distinction between perpetrators and accomplices, it is a
byproduct of the drafting of criminal codes, not a innate property of principal
perpetration or accessorial liability themselves. Curiously, the point is not entirely
academic for international criminal justice—the war crime of “willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury and cruel treatment” presumably furnishes a practical
illustration. Conceptually, there is no difference between perpetrators and accomplices of
this war crime, since treaty-makers have expunged any difference by employing
causation in the crimes’ definition.
205
For background to the derivative nature of complicity, see supra Part II.B above.
206
Fletcher, supra note 27, at 636.
207
For discussion of the partial derivative nature of accomplice liability, see infra section
III.A.2.
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considerable assistance Eichmann or others provide to direct perpetrators
as one of very many means of perpetrating an international crime.
Perpetrators can also be all those who contribute to a crime, whether
directly or through another.
This brings us to grammatical arguments. For many, the literal
construction of certain offenses uses terms that only a certain class of
perpetrator can satisfy, creating a category of crimes often dubbed “nonproxyable.”208 The classic illustrations on non-proxyable crimes include
bigamy (which only married people can perpetrate) and being drunk and
disorderly in a public place (which only drunk people can perpetrate), so
the argument is that a sober or unmarried person who assists these
offenses cannot perpetrate the crimes. If these examples seem too distant
from international criminal justice, consider Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the
Rwandan Minister of Women’s Development, who was found guilty of
rape for ordering militia under her influence to sexually violate Tutsi
women by the thousands.209 For many proponents of the “non-proxyable”
problem, convicting Nyiramasuhuko as a perpetrator of rape intolerably
pretends she has a capacity she does not—if rape is defined as requiring
the insertion of a penis into a woman’s vagina, she cannot be a
perpetrator.
Yet, I am not confident that this reasoning holds any real normative
value. This because complicity replicates the problem it is employed to
solve—Nyiramasuhuko is found guilty of rape as an accomplice too.210 So

if accessorial liability also fails to solve the non-proxyable problem, these
sorts of crimes are of no value in delimiting principal from accessorial
liability. True, re-casting complicity as the inchoate crime of criminal
facilitation might solve the problem outright (because Nyiramasuhuko
would not be labeled a rapist), but as I have highlighted earlier, this
ignores the sometimes tremendous harm accomplices’ actions actually
facilitate and discounts the fact that modern international criminal law
unfalteringly treats complicity as a means of participating in the
perpetrator’s crime, not as a separate inchoate offence. As such, we can
only soothe our anxieties about the non-proxyable problem by
understanding that it is inevitable in a system that views harm as morally
significant.
208

Kadish, supra note 101, at 373; Smith, supra note 102 at 107-110; Moore, supra note
15, at 418-420; Gardner, supra note 19, at 127, 136.
209
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 6087-6088
(June 24, 2011).
210
For proof of this in international criminal justice, see supra note 109 (showing that the
dispositions of international courts and tribunals make no mention of complicity in over
95% of complicity cases that lead to conviction. Instead, they merely declare the name of
the crime with which the accomplice is convicted.)
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Indeed, the problem remains unresolved in ordering, instigating,
JCE, superior responsibility, indirect perpetration, control over the act, coperpetration and functional perpetration; in short, all modes of liability.
With each of these doctrine, the perpetrator need not satisfy the physical
element in a criminal code. So why give Nyiramasuhuko’s anatomical
status special significance over other physical elements in the definition of
the crime? Doing so assumes an objective theory of perpetration: the
assumption that the perpetrator is only the person who pulls the trigger,
releases the gas, or, to borrow Eichmann’s metaphor, breaks the glass.
And yet, the objective theory of perpetration is entirely discredited
elsewhere,211 and the struggle for defensible solutions to the Hitler-asaccomplice dilemma in international criminal justice is a testament to its
inadequacy in practice.
This, admittedly, involves tolerating a type of fiction (here, that
Nyiramasuhuko inserted a penis in a woman’s vagina, when she did not).
This fiction could, of course, be quickly overcome by redefining rape (and
other international crimes) in causal terms (i.e., as “causing rape”),212 but
even absent this kind of major legislative exercise, “what matters morally
is significant causal contribution, not the kinds of limitations marked by
the causative verbs of English.”213 To absolve Nyiramasuhuko of liability
for the mass rape she caused based on a reference to physical attributes in
the offense that she does not possess is to prefer fidelity to verbal
semantics over substantive coherence. Like others, I believe that
“normative rather than linguistic considerations would seem the more
persuasive.”214 The overarching point, however, is that whatever real
problems non-proxyable crimes present are equally true of unitary and
differentiated models of perpetration alike, depriving this line of reasoning
of any analytical purchase in debates between the two models.
Another frequent argument is that the unitary theory of
perpetration violates the principle of legality by conferring judges with
undue discretion in sentencing? For many, if statutory offences were
meant to include even remote causal contributions, the legislature would
211

Fletcher, supra note 33, at 654-656 (highlighting reasons for the departure from the
objective theory of perpetration); Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, supra note 123, at 614
(placing the objective theory of perpetration in historical context, and demonstrating the
passage to a subjective theory, then the turn to “control over the act.”); Dubber, supra
note 7, at 983 (highlighting how the position in the US Model Penal Code resembles the
objective theory, perhaps explaining why the non-proxyable problem remains so vital in
English language theory).
212
As mentioned earlier, the war crime of “willfully causing great suffering” already
takes this form. See supra note 202.
213
Moore, supra note 15, at 417.
214
Kutz, supra note 105, at 303.
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have to enact even greater sentencing ranges below usual minimums,
conferring judges with extreme discretion in sentencing.215 This renders
law insufficiently certain. Worse, the breadth of this discretion would be
all the more worrisome as judges would still have to make the types of
intricate differentiations that are presently undertaken at the attribution
level (i.e., distinguishing between aiding, co-perpetration, indirect
perpetration, instigation, etc.) when calculating sentences, only these
determinations would take place without conceptual guidelines and behind
closed doors.216 Consequently, a unitary system just brushes the problems
under the carpet.
But these arguments are also unpersuasive. Although the point is
obscured by the ICC’s assumption of the differentiated model, the truth is
that in the many differentiated jurisdictions, judges reason inductively to
force facts into legal categories they feel allow for an appropriate
punishment.217 Instigation is elevated to indirect perpetration; aiding is
recast as co-perpetration. To illustrate, certain courts describe a case of
acting as a lookout for a criminal perpetrator—everywhere the textbook
example of aiding—as co-perpetration in order to allow for the full scope
of punishment afforded a perpetrator.218 In fact, this trend is so dominant
in practice that “[i]t seems that no longer the dogmatic categorization
determines the severity of the sentence imposed, but conversely that the
severity of the sentence deemed desirable determines the categorization of
the conduct in question.”219 If this is true, fears of judicial discretion are
215

CLAUS ROXIN, in: Burkhard Jähnke/Heinreich W. Laufhütte/Walter Odersky (ed.),
Strafgesetzbuch. Leipziger Kommentar :Erster Band, 11th ed. 2003, Vor § 25, marginal
number 6. See also, HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK and THOMAS WEIGEND, Lehrbuch des
Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil, 5th ed. 1996, 646.
216
Id., marginal number 8.
217
THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR
VON EINEM DIFFERENZIERENDEN BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIVFUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE 462 (1. Auflage. ed. 2009) (showing how
considerations of culpability and sentencing prompt practitioners and theorists to choose
somewhat arbitrarily between modes of attribution to apply.) Evidently, these practices
have a long history. Schrieber explains that during the Weimar Republic reform efforts
were undertaken to relax strict insistence on the derivative nature of complicity so as “to
constrain the scope of indirect perpetration and to relegate many of the cases that were
thus being dealt with as a species of perpetration back to the category of complicity.”
Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, supra note 123, at 620. This is also true in France, where the
fact that complicity does not attach to the lowest form of crimes (called “contraventions”)
leads the French Cour de Cassation to declare accomplices co-perpetrators to avoid their
acquittal. For details, see BERNARD BOULOC, GASTON STEFANI & GEORGES LEVASSEUR,
DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 287-288 (19e édition ed. 2005). For further modern examples
from the Netherlands and elsewhere, see Johannes Keiler, supra note 18, at 186-190.
218
HR 23 oktober 1990, NJ 1991, 328, cited in Keiler, supra note 18, at 187.
219
Keiler, supra note 18, at 190.
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unavoidable for both theories, meaning that the argument from legal
certainty does not lead inexorably to a differentiated system of
perpetration.
Finally, arguments about the expressive capacity of a differentiated
model do not appear to furnish it with great legitimacy. Under a
differentiated scheme, a defendant’s responsibility is expressed through
the combination of at least two essential components: (a) the mode of
participation; and (b) the name of the crime with which she is convicted.
To eliminate (a) returns us to the problem of fair labeling principle—the
criticism is that grouping the people who shot helpless refugees with AK47s and the businessman who supplied the weapons under a single banner
of say murder unfairly groups disparate degrees of responsibility, which a
fair system of representation ought to segregate by employing additional
qualifiers.220 This observation leads into often implicit normative
differences between perpetration and participation,221 and provides the
impetus for the invention of notions like functional perpetration, that
allow the doctrinal label to encapsulate an element of the collectivity
through which the crime came about.222
There are, in my view, at least four problems with this account,
each of which shows how a unitary theory is arguably more capable of
fine-tuned expression than its counterpart. First, and least importantly, the
argument for the expressive capabilities of a differentiated model ignores
that international courts and tribunals do not mention the mode of liability
within the disposition of their judgments in more that 95% percent of
cases surveyed.223 As we have seen, in the vast majority of instances,
dispositions contained in international judgments merely list element (b),

220

See infra section II.A; Frédéric Mégret also elevates fair labeling to a principle of
fairness in human rights. See Frédéric Mégret, Prospects for "Constitutional" Human
Rights Scrutiny of Substantive International Criminal Law by The ICC With Special
Emphasis on the General Part, http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Evaluating_FM.pdf
221
van Sliedregt, supra note 59 (arguing that whether members of a JCE must comply
with the full mens rea of genocide turns on whether they are perpetrators or participants);
Cassese, supra note 25, at 26 (arguing that it is a logical impossibility for someone who
does not have the necessary mens rea for genocide to “commit” the crime, but accepting
that he or she may aid and abet the crime nonetheless). I am grateful to Thomas Weigend
for confirming that the fact that JCE and Superior Responsibility purport to act as forms
of “committing” a crime whereas complicity is a mere means of participation is the
normative basis upon which the two concepts might diverge within a differentiated
model.
222
For one of the most thoughtful discussions, see Harmen van der Wilt, Joint Criminal
Enterprise and Functional Perpetration, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Andre Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009)
223
See supra note 104.
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the crime with which an accused is convicted.224 That there is almost
never mention of element (a) viz. the mode of liability within dispositions
tends to suggest an unfortunate mismatch between abstract theorizing and
practice—international criminal justice does not presently offer a vehicle
for the expressive capacity the differentiated model demands.
Other difficulties are more difficult to overcome. Take, for
instance, the miscommunication of responsibility inherent in labeling an
accomplice a genocidaire when she does not have the requisite special
intent. Some justify this disparity by pointing to a normative divide
between “committing” a crime and other forms of “participation,”225
although the rationale for the division invariably goes unannounced. In
purely analytical terms though, one struggles to see a justification for the
division when commission and participation both make an accused
responsible for one and the same crime. As a matter of logic, the
amalgamation of misaligned modes of liability and elements of crimes
must corrupt one or both concepts, and branding an accomplice with a
label he does not deserve still misrepresents responsibility, even if you
have diminished the time she will serve in prison.
A differentiated model uses legal terms to express graduated
degrees of blame, but there is also a danger that labels for modes of
liability need not carry any great meaning for relevant audiences, further
undermining the differentiated model’s expressive capacity. Arguably,
describing someone as an “instigator” of genocide means something
comprehensible to lay stakeholders in certain jurisdictions, but I have
grave doubts whether murder through a combination of indirect and coperpetration holds any comparable significance. The risk is that the
meaning of increasingly abstract legal terms used to describe modes of
liability seems esoteric to ordinary citizens, who no longer understand the
terminology or its moral implications.226 If this is true, a lack of
comprehension among the public adds another layer of distortion to the
condemnatory aspirations of international trials.
Contrary to usual expectations, the unitary theory may offer
greater expressive capacity here. Under the unitary model, an accused
could be convicted of genocide, denoting that she made a substantial
contribution to the destruction of an ethnic group with the requisite
intention to bring the crime about, then a judgment could append a single
concise plain language explanation of her contribution i.e. GUILTY of
genocide for supplying machetes to the Interahamwe. Structurally, one
would immediately know that this conduct led to the crime described and
224
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that the defendant adopted a subjective disposition necessary to constitute
genocide—she really wanted the Tutsi exterminated. The differentiated
alternative (i.e. GUILTY of (a) aiding and abetting (b) genocide) does not
tell us nearly as much about the culpability of the accused, because the
formalistic concept “aiding and abetting” varies so widely from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and, just as importantly, may spoil the identity
of the crime.
This leads to a final related observation. To date, much of the
debate around modes of liability in international criminal justice seems to
have presumed that the crime and the mode of liability must do all the
expressive work. But what prevents the judgment itself shouldering some
of this load? For example, functional perpetration is necessary, we are
told, to symbolically denounce the collective apparatus that enabled the
individual crime.227 And yet this begs the question why a court could not
simply state whatever collective structures enabled the offence as part of
its narrative. Without addressing this question, these often very insightful
analyses of how traditional notions of perpetration do not adequately
capture the reality of collective action that are so frequently part and
parcel of atrocity risk overburdening “modes of liability,” when a plain
language explanation within a judgment may suffice.

B.

The Specificities of International Crimes

If a unitary theory of perpetration is not theoretically foreclosed,
we must inquire which of the two models is preferable for the
particularities of international crimes. From the very beginning, the fact
that an international system of blame attribution does not already exist is
surely anomalous—for all the international interest in ending impunity,
transitional justice and modes of liability, there is no treaty regime that
defines modes of participation international crimes. With war crimes for
instance, the Geneva Conventions themselves furnish “only keywords to
designate a criminal act, nothing which can be called a definition”,228
leaving a range of indispensable criminal concepts “under a cloud of
227
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obscurity.”229 This is most certainly true of modes of participating in these
crimes—while the Conventions require states to implement legislation
allowing for the prosecution of those responsible for “committing or
ordering to be committed”,230 they deliberately stopped short of
elaborating on the extent of these concepts.231 Whatever might be said
about the merit of this approach as a means of securing broad participation
in the treaty regime, it has proved to be a thorn in the side of practitioners
ever since.
Despite popular views to the contrary, the ICC Statute does not
markedly change this situation. For one reason, some of the world’s
leading countries are not party to the ICC Statute, meaning that recourse
to customary international law remains inevitable in many instances where
international crimes might be enforced. As a reflection of this, the ICC
Statute formally safeguards the continued co-existence of customary
international law outside the treaty regime,232 allowing for a complex
mosaic of blame standards that stem from all range of international legal
sources to simultaneously co-habitat the discipline. Even states that have
signed and ratified the Rome Treaty are not required to emulate modes of
attribution as defined in the ICC statute within their domestic legal orders.
As a consequence, international modes of liability are extremely difficult
to identify.
The first problem with the scheme is methodological. While the
ICC Statute brings a degree of clarity to cases arising within its four walls,
many international trials still depend on custom as a source of law. The
difficulty is, as Martii Koskiennemi famously argued, that custom is quite
“useless” at generating definitive standards.233 So even in a field like
229
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international human rights, where legal precision is comparatively less
important, some of the leading exponents observe that “the human rights
movement’s quest for additional sources finds its favorite candidate,
customary international law, in the midst of a profound identity crisis.”234
Despite this crisis, a differentiated system of blame attribution in
international criminal justice depends on the very same candidate for
defining the terms of serious criminal responsibility.
This leads to major practical difficulties. For instance, despite the
prolific use of JCE III over the past debate, the Extraordinary Chambers in
Cambodia recently disagreed with the original Tadić decision that had
declared JCE III part of customary international law.235 Whatever might
be said about the relative strengths of either court’s reasoning, the content
of customary modes of attribution is clearly unacceptably uncertain if
different judicial bodies can reach diametrically opposed conclusions
based on similar materials. While it is arguably not the business of
international criminal justice to overcome the latent deficiencies with
customary international law writ large, the absence of any restriction on
the number of “modes of liability” enables types of scenario to continue
unchecked. Put differently, a unitary theory of perpetration precludes the
uncertainties of custom infiltrating the criminal process.
The wider concern is that such an ill-defined set of differentiated
“modes of liability” violate the principle of legality. As we well know, the
principle of legality has a rich but troubled history in international
criminal law, from its identification as a merely principle of justice at
Nuremberg to more definite modern accounts that sometimes do not
restrain any better.236 When the methodology for identifying customary
standards is so vague, and there is no numerical cap on how many modes
should be prohibited that is driving the analysis of custom, not some objectively
ascertainable standard that might be obtained in a dispassionate positivist fashion.
234
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AYIL 82, 88 (1988); The attempts to justify concepts
in human rights (and international criminal law) into the corpus of customary
international law even though they are not easily reconciled with normal standards for
identifying custom is, I suspect, an example of what David Kennedy calls “a combination
of overly formal reliance on textual articulations that are anything but clear or binding
and sloppy humanitarian argument.” See David Kennedy, International Human Rights
Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 120 (2002).
235
Prosecutor v Ieng et al, Case No: 002-19-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), para. 83 “For
the foregoing reasons, the Pre-Trial Chamber does not find that the authorities relied
upon in Tadic…constitute a sufficiently firm basis to conclude that JCEIII formed part of
customary international law at the time relevant to Case 002.”
236
For an excellent overview of this history together with modern manifestations of the
problem, see Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the
Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119 (2008).

2011]

THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY”

68

of liability might be “discovered” in customary international law, the
danger is that international blame attribution seriously threatens
legality.237 As Beth Van Schaack points out, most common law
jurisdictions prohibited the notion of common law crimes in the 19th
century, precisely because the combination of judge-made law and serious
criminal liability was perceived as compromising legality and its liberal
underpinnings.238 And yet modern international criminal justice not only
permits the historical anachronism, it also places no limit on the quantity
of modes of liability the methodology can generate.
This leads to a further set of problems. Even where the principle of
legality is honored, international standards of blame attribution remain
seriously fragmented. Complicity itself is an illustration. If we accept the
differentiated system incorporated in the ICC together with the German
mechanisms for dividing perpetrators and accomplices, we are still left
with a mental standard for complicity in the ICC that is markedly higher
than the equivalent in the vast majority of crimes within that court’s
jurisdiction, with standards before other international courts that claim
knowledge but contract to recklessness in practice (thus violating
culpability in certain circumstances), and with all range of domestic
variants of complicity across the spectrum of national courts capable of
trying international crimes. If we are serious about international
expressive accounts of international justice,239 a real danger is that the
meaning of international condemnation is lost in translation.
This draws us back into earlier discussion about the superior
expressive capabilities of a unitary theory. In our previous theoretical
discussion, we observed how a unitary theory allows a principled
determination of criminal responsibility, then flexible opportunities to
describe the nature of the contribution without legalese. I the expressive
value of modes of are not fully comprehended within the national
jurisdictions where they originated, they are likely to export very poorly to
foreign cultures as part of the international adjudicatory process, given
that victims, perpetrators and members of their communities are even less
familiar with the significance of terms like “instigation,” “joint criminal
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enterprise” or “indirect perpetration.”240 In the words of Immi Tallgren,
the disapproval communicated by international criminal justice “risks
being unclear or having adverse connotations, depending on the
background of the offender.” The same is true for victims and local
communities.
Aside from concerns about the quality of the responsibility
expressed, there are also the absence of substantive restraints on the scope
of international modes of liability—the open-ended system of
differentiated “modes of liability” does little to ensure that the standards
courts apply accord with any conceptual foundations. This, as we have
seen, is an acute problem when international courts draw so heavily on
national doctrine that may or may not accord with basic principles in
blame attribution, and when universal jurisdiction allows all range of
courts to hear these cases. The open ended nature of modes of liability acts
as an invitation for practitioners socialized in different systems to
prioritize their own domestic schooling in criminal law, since that is what
most senior practitioners bring to international prosecution. The
differentiated system does not tell us which of the myriad variants
international courts should adopt nor place conceptual restrictions on
modes of liability of the type outlined here. In the face of this reality, a
unitary theory of perpetration might better preserve (and advertise)
culpability as the benchmark for international criminal responsibility,
ending the various phases of international courts mimicking of domestic
practice and shifting academic debates to issues of sentencing, where
these discussions belong.
Equally importantly, the unitary theory would simplify a body of
rules governing international modes of liability that has attained a degree
of technicality that is in jeopardy of alienating those who matter most.
From experience, very few practitioners of international criminal justice
understand the full import of “modes of liability,” which they tend to
allocate to experts trained in relevant national jurisdictions wherever
possible. This tendency is exacerbated when leading texts describing
prominent international modes of liability are not available in official
United Nations languages, further reinforcing the professional dependence
on experts socialized in only a small number of jurisdictions. It goes
without saying that these issues are likely to inhibit the engaged
participation of victims, perpetrators and affected communities, who are
generally even less equipped to deal with technocratic jargon than the
professionals who represent them. It would probably be easier to endure
these struggles if they were conceptually unavoidable, but of course, they
are not.
240
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A unitary theory might also mediate the dissonance between
national and international concepts of blame attribution more
meaningfully. At present, standards of blame attribution vary wildly from
one jurisdiction to the next, producing a fragmented array of rules.
Predictably, the dissimilarity in international versus domestic standards
has and will continue to cause major practical problems. In one case tried
within the Netherlands, for instance, a Dutch court invested considerable
energy into determining whether it was required to apply international or
domestic notions of complicity when prosecuting its own national for
genocide.241 From the reasoning in the decision, the question appeared
determinative of the defendant’s responsibility for a crime no less than
genocide—application of the national standard of complicity led to
conviction; the international equivalent did not. Without common
standards of blame attribution, serious criminal responsibility presently
turns on largely arbitrary elections between two competing notions of
blame attribution.
The system that is also highly inefficient. As is well known, the
two ad hoc UN international tribunals alone are estimated to have claimed
roughly 15 percent of the United Nations annual budget, which a projected
cost of around $25 million per case.242 While it is nigh on impossible to
quantify the portion of that figure attributable to the unsettled pluralistic
nature of international modes of liability, there can be little doubt that
radically limiting litigation over these concepts would free up
considerable capacity, save donors resources and hasten trials.243 Just a
short glance at the number of appellate cases that involve complex (but
conceptually unnecessary) questions about modes of liability confirm as
241
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much. A more efficient system promotes rights to expeditious trial that are
frequently in jeopardy internationally, and makes capital available that
might minimize the selectivity of trials. As such, a more streamlined
concept of perpetration promotes accountability.
Finally, to return to one of the central themes of this paper, a
unified theory of perpetration is important from a purely functional
perspective. Throughout, much of the debate about “modes of liability”
has assumed a false duality between mastermind and physical perpetrator.
In reality, there are also accomplices who make important (sometimes
indispensible) contributions to the ways atrocities unfold. I have in mind
corporations—the suppliers of weapons, the banks who finance military
offensives, representatives of extractive industries who bankroll
warlords—all play surprisingly important roles in sustaining modern
bloodshed. Although these sorts of inputs have received little more than
hortatory acknowledgement in modern international criminal justice, as
soon as this veil is lifted, we will see that unified standards of blame
attribution are essential to creating a level playing field capable of treating
accomplices equally.
Without this, the system of international criminal law enables safehavens, corporate races to the regulatory bottom to avoid liability, and
perceptions that businesses in certain jurisdictions are at a competitive
disadvantage vis-à-vis those elsewhere. In other areas, international law
has some great experience in erecting universal standards in order to deal
with these global realities—in treaties ranging from the Warsaw
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International
Carriage by Air to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, states have rationalized a single set of
standards to address transnational practices. So while I am sensitive to the
compelling arguments for pluralism in international criminal justice,244 I
can only assume that in international criminal justice too, the need to
avoid overt injustice trumps the otherwise understandable desire for
doctrinal heterogeneity between legal systems.
How then would this uniformity be achieved? A unitary theory of
perpetration for international crimes cannot simply replace all standards of
attribution everywhere—the prospect of revolutionizing global standards
of attribution is politically unthinkable and culturally undesirable.
Nonetheless, national courts prosecuting international crimes could use an
international unitary standard of perpetration in domestic cases involving
international crimes, leaving habitual modes of attribution to continue
unaffected for everyday domestic crimes. As a matter of ironic
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coincidence, this would emulate an extant scheme in German law, which
applies a unitary theory of perpetration to a specific subset of
administrative offences, even though it maintains its famous differentiated
model for other crimes.245 The only difference would be that this model
would displace and annul customary international standards then apply
uniformly throughout all courts capable of exercising jurisdiction over
international crimes.

V. CONCLUSION
In a recent article questioning the merit of a continued distinction
between perpetration and complicity, one eminent expert in criminal
theory asks, “how can there be such frequent disparities of responsibility
and culpability between perpetrators and accomplices when both are
equally guilty of the crime in question?”246 The answer to the question in
domestic criminal law lies in fragmented growth of criminal law in stages
though different epochs, leaving a unified body of rules that need not
coincide with rational principles.247 In international criminal law,
however, the answer lies in the fact that international courts have
borrowed historically contingent doctrine from these domestic systems,
even when they defy accepted principles international courts themselves
nobly endorse as a matter of course. Modes of liability, and complicity in
particular, typify this trend.
Ever since the modern revival of the international criminal project,
“modes of liability” have arguably featured as the most debated topic. In
response to an acute unease with treating Hitler as an accessory,
international criminal courts and tribunals have adopted controversial
domestic models that resolve the problem, but scholars have more recently
exposed the objectionable nature of aspects of these doctrines, forcing
international courts into a third phase characterized by a sweeping
receptivity to German distinctions between perpetrators and accomplices.
In each of these phases, we scholars have only focused on a limited set of
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modes of liability, without considering the broader implications for
international blame attribution writ large. Simultaneously, international
influence, both legal and political, has emerged as the dominant
explanation for the various departures from basic principles in blame
attribution.
Complicity, however, also fails many of the standard tests
employed to criticize modes of liability in international criminal justice,
and in all likelihood, modes of liability as a species will suffer the same
fate. As I suggest throughout, this troubling reality stems less from
international influence and more from the natural infiltration of
indefensible domestic doctrine into the international arena. Thus, while
the common criticism is that international modes of liability have lost
touch with “the restraining force of the criminal law tradition,”248 this
perspective overlooks the domestic criminal law’s long history of internal
inconsistency and the great influence of domestic principles
internationally. So if experts sadly observe “a gap between liberal rhetoric
(general principles) and practical reality (pervasive exception) within
national criminal systems,”249 we should be unsurprised to find that it
resurfaces internationally.
This said, there may be scope for reversing this trend. In his
seminal work on the grammar of criminal law, George Fletcher posits that
international law, and international criminal law in particular, can come to
play a vital role in the development of defensible domestic doctrine. He
argues that “the task of theorists in the current century is to elaborate the
general principles of criminal law that should be recognized not only in
the International Criminal Court, but in all civilized nations.”250 If this
framing is correct, a unitary theory of perpetration for international crimes
could overcome the sometimes major shortcomings of modes of liability
in international criminal law and act as a constructive influence on
domestic practices. Until then, domestic criminal law will remain a vital
and predominantly welcome point of reference for international courts and
tribunals, but a mature international system also recognizes the darkness it
stands to inherit from its domestic predecessors and opts for a different
path.
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